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WHAT’S NEW FOR POLICE IN 
THE LIBRARY
The Justice Institute of British Columbia Library is an 
excellent resource for learning. Here is a list of its 
recent acquisitions which may be of interest to 
police. 
The bully-proof workplace: essential strategies, 
tips, and scripts for dealing with the office 
sociopath.
Peter J. Dean, MS, PhD, & Molly  D. Shepard, MS, 
MSM.
New York : McGraw-Hill, Education, 2017.
HF 5549.5 E43 D426 2017
Busted: an illustrated history of drug prohibition 
in Canada.
Susan Boyd.
Winnipeg: Fernwood Publishing, 2017.
HV 5840 C2 B69 2017
Collisions in the digital paradigm: law and rule-
making in the internet age.
David Harvey.
Oxford; Portand: Hart Publishing, 2017.
K 4240 H36 2017
Ctrl + Z: the right to be forgotten.
Meg Leta Jones.
New York; London: New York University Press, 2016.
K 3264 C65 J66 2016
Cyber frauds, scams and their victims.
Mark Button & Cassandra Cross.
London; New York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis 
Group, 2017.
HV 6773 B87 2017
The dynamics of criminological research.
Jennifer Schulenberg.
Don Mills: Oxford University Press, 2016.
HV 6024.5 S383 2016
Improving professional learning: twelve strategies 
to enhance performance.
Alan B. Knox, foreword by Ronald M. Cervero.
Sterling: Stylus Publishing, LLC, 2016.
LC 1059 K66 2016
In an unspoken voice: how the body releases 
trauma and restores goodness
Peter A. Levine ; foreword by Gabor Maté.
Berkeley: North Atlantic Books, 2010.
RC 552 T7 L483 2010
The learner-centered curriculum: design and 
implementation.
Roxanne Cullen, Michael Harris, Reinhold R. Hill; 
Maryellen Weimer, Consulting Editor.
San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2012.
LB 2361.5 C85 2012
Local government in Canada.
C. Richard Tindal, Susan Nobes Tindal, Kennedy 
Stewart & Patrick J. Smith.
Toronto: Nelson Education, 2017
JS 1709 T55 2016
Open source leadership: reinventing management 
when there's no more business as usual.
Rajeev Peshawaria.
New York: McGraw-Hill Education, 2018.
HD 57.7 P469 2018
Out of our minds: the power of being creative.
Sir Ken Robinson, PhD.
West Sussex: Capstone, a Wiley brand, 2017.
BF 408 R635 2017
Streetdrugs: a drug identification guide.
Long Lake: Publishers Group West, 2018.
RM 316 S775 2018
Successful manager's handbook: develop 
yourself, coach others.
Susan H. Gebelein [and others] and the consultants 
of PDI Ninth House.
Minneapolis: PDI Ninth House; Roswell: PreVisor, 
2010.
HD 58.9 S833 2010
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CAPE 2018
Canadian Association of Police Educators
PRACADEMICS:
Bridging the Gap Between Academia & Police Training
June 25-29, 2018
Pacific Region Training Centre
Chilliwack, British Columbia
www.cape-educators.ca
More info on p. 34
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NO AUTOMATIC RIGHT TO 
SPEAK TO LAWYER AGAIN
R. v. Watson, 2018 BCCA 74 
British Columbia (BC) police were 
informed by United States (US) 
investigators that pornographic 
images had been uploaded to a 
Microsoft storage service by a user 
associated with a BC address. BC police then 
sought and obtained a  warrant to search the BC 
address associated with the uploads. The accused 
was home when the police arrived and executed 
the warrant. BC police seized 49 exhibits including 
a USB containing 663 suspected child pornography 
images. Three weeks later the accused was arrested 
at his home. By then, he had already retained a 
lawyer. 
After being informed of the charges, the 
accused immediately told police he 
wanted to speak to his lawyer. 
Nevertheless, the police gave  him the 
standard? Charter? advice and warning. 
He was transported to the  police station 
where  he spoke to a lawyer. After he 
spoke to a lawyer, the accused was 
interviewed, for about four hours. 
Before commencing the interview, the 
officer confirmed that the accused had 
spoken to his lawyer and understood 
the advice he had been given. Part way 
through the interview, the accused asked to speak 
to his lawyer again but the request was denied 
because  he had already spoken to his lawyer. The 
accused stated that his lawyer had told him not to 
discuss anything with the police. The police officer 
told him “that was fine” but the police officer 
would continue talking.
During the interview, the accused asserted his right 
to silence a number of times and said his lawyer 
had told him not to discuss anything with the 
police. He said he knew that anything he said 
could be used against him. In the course of the 
interview the accused made several admissions, 
including:
• He was the owner and only user of the computer 
the police had seized;
• On the morning of the search he had been 
looking at pictures on a USB the police had 
found inserted into his computer desktop tower;
• He knew the images he collected were illegal 
but that he could not stop himself from looking 
at them; and 
• He agreed with the police officer that the only 
reason to keep such a collection was for sexual 
gratification. 
The interview was audio and video taped,
British Columbia Provincial Court
The judge found, among other things, 
that the  accused’s statement was 
admissible. First, the judge found the 
statement was freely and voluntarily 
given. There was no atmosphere  of oppression 
during the interview nor were any inducements 
made. The accused was articulate, understood his 
right to remain silent and had an operating mind at 
the time he made his statement. Second, the judge 
found there was no s. 10(b) Charter breach. Even 
though the accused had expressed a wish to speak 
with counsel again part way through the interview, 
he had a right to do so only if there were changed 
circumstances resulting from new procedures, a 
change in the jeopardy he faced, or a  reason to 
believe that the first information that he had 
received was deficient. Since  none of these factors 
arose, the  judge concluded the police complied 
with s. 10(b). The accused was convicted of 
possessing child pornography.
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British Columbia Court of Appeal 
The accused appealed his 
conviction arguing, among 
other things, that the trial judge 
e r r e d i n a d m i t t i n g h i s 
statement. Justice  Saunders, speaking for the 
unanimous Appeal Court, disagreed. 
The accused’s statement was voluntary  and did not 
breach s. 7. The interview was not oppressive. 
None of the officer’s statements were coercive, 
threatening, or offered an inducement. Nor was the 
accused confused about the subject matter of the 
interview. 
With respect to s. 10(b), the Court of Appeal found 
there were no changes in circumstances as 
described by the  Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. 
Sinclair, 2010 SCC 35, such that the police were 
obligated to provide the accused with a reasonable 
opportunity to consult counsel again. Justice 
Saunders stated:?
[T]here were no?new procedures involving [the 
accused]; no change to the jeopardy he was 
facing; and no reason to believe that [the 
accused] had not understood his initial legal 
advice. In particular, the judge’s conclusion that 
[the accused] understood his right to remain 
silent throughout the interview negates his 
submission of confusion; no additional charges 
were layered into the interview that were not 
first mentioned to him at its beginning; no 
further investigative methods or other matters 
were employed that would have engaged his 
right to consult a lawyer again. [para. 15]
The trial judge did not err  in admitting the 
accused’s statement and his appeal was dismissed.  
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
Renewed Right to Counsel Revisited
Detainees should be given an opportunity to 
speak to a lawyer again where there is a change 
in circumstances (R. v. Sinclair, 2010 SCC 35) 
such as:
1. New “non-routine” procedures involving the 
detainee which do not generally fall within the 
expectation of the advising lawyer at the time 
of the initial consultation (eg. participation in a 
physical lineup or polygraph). 
? Recording arrestee's voice during interview 
for later voice comparison is not a new 
“non-routine” procedure (R. v. Wu, 2010 ABCA 
337).
? Participating in a re-enactment is not a new 
“non-routine” procedure. A re-enactment is 
nothing more than a statement by conduct 
(R. v. Ashmore, 2011 BCCA 18 leave to appeal to 
SCC refused, [2011] SCCA No 280).
2. A change in the jeopardy facing the detainee 
(the investigation takes a new and more serious 
turn as events unfold)
? The gradual or progressive revelation of 
incriminating evidence does not, without 
more, give rise to a renewed right to 
counsel. (R. v. Ashmore, 2011 BCCA 18 leave to 
appeal to SCC refused, [2011] SCCA No 280).
? The police practice of disclosing 
information, be it true or false, to 
encourage a detainee to talk does not, 
without more, re-trigger s. 10(b) rights (R. v. 
Ashmore, 2011 BCCA 18 leave to appeal to SCC 
refused, [2011] SCCA No 280).
3. There is reason to question the detainee’s 
understanding of their s. 10(b) right to counsel.
“[T]here were no new procedures involving [the accused]; no change to the jeopardy he 
was facing; and no reason to believe that [he] had not understood his initial legal 
advice ...; no additional charges were layered into the interview that were not first 
mentioned to him at its beginning; no further investigative methods or other matters were 
employed that would have engaged his right to consult a lawyer again.”
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VAGUE CHILD WELFARE 
CONCERN DID NOT JUSTIFY 
ENTRY 
R. v. McMahon, 2018 SKCA 26,
Police received information from a 
Mobile Crisis Unit (MCU) about an 
anonymous tip the Unit received 
concerning  the well-being of the 
accused’s children. The tipster stated 
that the children were not being properly fed and 
the home had poor living conditions. The MCU 
requested the RCMP to “go and just take a look, 
find out what things were like and report back to 
them”. Two officers, a  corporal and a constable, 
attended the accused’s home. When they pulled 
into the yard, the accused exited her house and 
greeted the officers. The corporal told the accused 
about the anonymous tip and the purpose for the 
police visit. The accused asked for a few moments 
to “clean up” her home before police entered. This 
request was denied, the corporal explaining it 
would be inconsistent with the purpose of a spot 
check. 
The accused then turned, opened the door, and 
entered her residence. Both officers followed her 
inside and, when they entered, detected the odour 
of burnt marihuana. The officers walked up the 
entrance stairs to an open living room and kitchen 
area where they encountered two other adults and 
three  young children. Police noticed a mason jar 
containing marihuana bud on top of a microwave 
stand. The adults, including the accused, were 
immediately arrested for possessing a controlled 
substance and the children taken into care. In the 
course  of retrieving a pair of socks for one of the 
children, police noticed a number of marihuana 
plants in a separate  room in the basement. The 
residence was secured and a warrant obtained to 
search the  accused’s home and out-buildings. Upon 
e x e c u t i n g t h e w a r r a n t , p o l i c e  s e i z e d 
191?marihuana plants. The accused was charged 
with unlawfully producing marihuana, possessing it 
for the purpose of trafficking, and unlawful storage 
of a firearm.
Saskatchewan Provincial Court
The officer testified the reason for 
entering  the accused’s house was to 
check on the welfare of the children and 
the conditions of the  home. It also was 
revealed that the occurrence report generated by 
police dispatch had referenced possible  “drug use” 
in relation to the accused but this “drug use” 
allegation had not found its way into the search 
warrant’s information to obtain (ITO).
The judge went on to find that the police breached 
the accused’s s. 8 Charter rights. In his view, the 
police were present at the accused’s home?merely 
to? inquire? into the well-being of the children and 
the anonymous tip to MCU did not constitute 
reasonable grounds to enter the home. Although 
the police were entitled to approach the house 
under the implied licence doctrine and ask the 
accused questions, the police exceeded its scope 
when they entered the home. 
This warrantless entry was presumptively 
unreasonable, a presumption the Crown failed to 
rebut. First, the judge found the accused had not 
consented to the entry of her home. Second, the 
police were not acting  under their common law 
duty  to protect life and safety; the police did not 
believe that the lives or safety of the children were 
in danger. Rather, the corporal was only acting on a 
vague and anonymous t ip. The of f icer ’s 
observations made in the course of the police entry 
were excised from the ITO and, without them, the 
warrant should not have been issued. The 
warrantless, non-consensual, non-urgent search of 
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the accused’s residence was unreasonable. The 
judge went on to exclude the evidence under s. 
24(2) and dismissed all charges.  
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal
The Crown appealed the trial 
judge’s ruling arguing he erred 
in his analysis of the police 
officers’ authority to enter the 
accused ’s home.? I n the 
Crown’s view, there  were three legitimate basis’ for 
police entry: (1) Manitoba’s Child and Family 
Services Act (CFSA); (2) consent; and (3) the 
common law police duty to preserve peace, 
prevent crime and protect life and safety.
The Crown submitted that the duty to investigate 
imposed on police under the  CFSA implicitly 
authorized entry into a private dwelling, without 
judicial authorization, in order to investigate 
whether the children in the home were in need of 
protection. In the Crown’s opinion, a warrantless 
entry  in a non-emergency situation is an implied 
and necessary off-shoot of the “duty to investigate” 
imposed by?s.?13. Or, in the alternative, the Crown 
suggested s. 13.1 implicitly authorized police entry 
when a parent does not expressly refuse entry.?
The Court of Appeal considered several CFSA 
sections. 
• Under s. 13, an officer?is obligated to investigate 
information they receive if, in the opinion of the 
officer,? reasonable grounds exists to believe that 
a child is in need of protection. 
• Section 13.1 authorizes entry into a private 
dwelling with a warrant provided, among other 
things, an officer has reasonable grounds to 
believe that a child?may?be in need of protection 
and a person refuses to give the peace officer 
access to the child. 
• Section 17 authorizes a warrantless intervention 
on an exigent basis provided the officer has 
reasonable and probable grounds to believe that 
a child is both in need of protection?and?at risk 
of serious harm. 
• The apprehension of a child by police is an 
interim, highly-intrusive measure that is 
disruptive to the parent/child relationship and 
considered a remedy of last resort.  
• There was nothing in the? CFSA? that expressly 
authorizes an officer to enter a private dwelling 
for the purpose of conducting an investigation. 
Even if the Crown’s argument that the s.?13 duty on 
officers to investigate a child protection concern 
implicitly authorized entry, the officer would first 
n e e d t o b e o f t h e o p i n i o n t h a t t h e r e 
were? reasonable grounds? to believe that a 
child?was?in need of protection. Here, however, the 
corporal did not subjectively believe the accused’s 
children were in need of protection. “At no place 
in her testimony did [the corporal] identify the 
basis or foundation for her belief that [the 
accused’s] children were in need of protection, 
apart from reference to the anonymous tip (which 
incidentally alluded to the presence of drugs),” 
said Justice Schwann, authoring the Court of 
Appeal’s opinion. “In her mind, the ‘check’ was 
required to firstly determine? if? the children were 
in need of protection. At no point did [she] 
articulate any discernible  fact(s) that she relied on 
to support a  basis to believe the  children were in 
need of protection, apart from the anonymous 
tip.”  Further, even if the corporal possessed a 
subjective belief, it was not objectively reasonable. 
“There was s imply no evidence of any 
confirmatory investigation having been done by 
Mobile Crisis or, for that matter, [the corporal] to 
substantiate the reliability of the information 
provided by the anonymous source,” said Justice 
Schwann. 
The trial judge did not err in concluding that the 
officer did not subjectively believe the accused’s 
children were in need of protection or that any 
subjective belief would not have been objectively 
reasonable. Without reasonable grounds, s. 13 was 
not engaged and therefore there was no 
corresponding  statutory duty imposed on police to 
investigate. This undermined any “implied power of 
entry” and there was no need for the  Court of 
Appeal to determine whether the duty to investigate 
under? s. 13? impliedly authorized entry into a 
private dwelling without warrant. 
MANITOBA’s CFSA
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The Crown contended that the accused’s actions 
indicated that she waived her right to privacy  and 
consented to police entry. First, the Crown 
suggested that since the  accused did not actually 
refuse police entry, the police had an implied right 
to enter her home in pursuit of its child protection 
mandate. Second, the Crown opined that the 
criminal law informational components for consent 
did not apply in child protection cases. In its view, 
a less robust consent standard was warranted in 
child protection investigations. But the Court of 
appeal disagreed. “Criminal protections for an 
accused person must [not] be watered down or 
eschewed entirely simply because the impugned 
police  action arose in a broad, unsubstantiated 
child protection context,”  said Justice Schwann, 
describing a valid consent as follows:
[F]or consent to be valid, at a minimum, two 
requirements are necessary: the consent must 
be voluntary and it must be informed. To be 
informed, individuals must have the requisite 
informational foundation to make their choice 
meaningful. This has been interpreted to mean 
that an individual must be made aware of his or 
her right to refuse consent, otherwise the 
consent is not voluntary. To be voluntary, the 
person must have a choice. [para. 83]
In this case, the trial judge found no evidence of a 
valid consent and the evidence amply supported 
this conclusion. The police did not take any steps to 
inform the accused of her right to refuse police 
entry  or of their ability to get a warrant under? s. 
13.1 of the?CFSA?if she refused. 
Although the  accused was informed about the 
anonymous tip and the reason for police presence 
(to conduct a spot check on her house and 
children), the police made no effort to explain their 
authority under the? CFSA, or to identify the 
accused’s right to refuse police entry without a 
warrant. Neither was she made aware of the 
potential consequences of her choice. ”The onus 
was on the  Crown to demonstrate that [the 
accused’s] consent was both voluntary and 
informed,” said Justice Schwann. “Knowledge of 
the options open to her and an appreciation of the 
consequences are essential components for a  valid 
consent.” The Crown had failed to meet this onus. 
The Crown maintained that the common law police 
duty  to preserve peace, prevent crime and protect 
life and safety authorized a forced entry. A 
warrantless entry can sometimes be authorized 
under the police common law duty to protect life 
and property provided the entry amounts to a 
justifiable use of police powers. This analysis 
requires a consideration of whether the  entry was 
necessary  in the circumstances and there were no 
less intrusive means available. After reviewing the 
case law concerning the police common law 
power to enter a residence to protect a person’s life 
or safety, the  Court of Appeal noted two important 
points. “First, the police duty to protect life is only 
engaged when it can be inferred that someone is 
or may be in some distress,”  said Justice Schwann. 
“Second, the duty to protect life only justifies 
warrantless entry where the police  reasonably 
believe the life or safety of someone in the home is 
in danger and the exercise of the power is both 
reasonable and necessary.” 
In this case, the Court of Appeal agreed with the 
trial judge that the forced entry was not justified. 
There was no evidence the children were in 
distress, nor did the corporal personally? think the 
children were in danger or that their lives or safety 
were a pressing concern. Rather, the police were 
on a fact-finding mission (investigating) for MCU to 
determine whether there was any validity  to the 
anonymous tip. Since they did not have reasonable 
grounds to believe the children were in distress, 
entry into the home was not necessary. 
Furthermore, there were other less intrusive 
measures other than entry available to the police, 
such as reporting back to the MCU or seeking a 
warrant.
The trial judge’s decision to exclude the evidence 
was upheld and the Crown’s appeal was dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
COMMON LAW DUTY
CONSENT
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SFSTs CAN BE USED IN 
REGULATORY 24-HOUR 
DRIVING PROIBITION
Kumar v. British Columbia (Attorney General), 
2018 BCCA 134
At about 11:30 pm a police officer 
stopped a truck  after observing it 
straddling the fog line and make a 
wide left turn into the number two 
lane rather than the  number one 
lane. When the vehicle  was stopped, the officer 
smelled freshly burnt marijuana on the driver and 
in the cabin of the truck. The driver had a history of 
dug possession and, when the occupants were 
arrested, the officer found rolling papers and 
marihuana. From his observations at roadside, the 
officer suspected that the driver’s ability to operate 
a motor vehicle was impaired by drugs. Another 
officer trained in Standard Field Sobriety Tests 
(SFSTs), otherwise known as physical coordination 
tests, was called to the  stop to administer these 
tests. The driver failed all three tests. 
• Horizontal gaze nystagmus test: the driver 
was unable to follow the visual stimulus with 
his eyes.
• One leg stand test: the driver lost balance 
after five seconds on the  one leg stand test, and 
he counted 30 seconds in a 15 second time 
span.
• Walk and turn test: the driver?  lost balance 
standing in the heel-toe position while the 
walk and turn test was being explained and, 
instead of walking nine steps forward, turning 
around and walking nine steps back, he 
walked forward nine steps, then walked 
backwards.
Police also noted the driver was lethargic and slow 
in the  way he moved, talked and conducted 
himself. As a result of the tests and observations 
made, the driver was served a 24-hour driving 
prohibition under s. 215(3) of BC’s Motor Vehicle 
Act (MVA).
British Columbia Supreme Court
The driver sought judicial review of the 
24-hour prohibition imposed on him. He 
wan ted an o rde r qua sh ing t he 
prohibition and thereby expunging it 
from his record. He argued that the officer did not 
have the requisite grounds to impose the 
prohibition (ie. there were grounds to believe that 
BY THE BOOK:
s. 215(3) BC’s Motor Vehicle Act
s. 215(3) A peace officer may, at any time or 
place on a highway or industrial road if the 
peace officer has reasonable and probable 
grounds to believe that a driver's ability to 
drive a motor vehicle is affected by a drug, 
other than alcohol.
s. 254(2)(a) Criminal Code
s. 254(2) If a peace officer has reasonable grounds to 
suspect that a person has alcohol or a drug in their body and 
that the person has, within the preceding three hours, 
operated a motor vehicle ... or had the care or control of a 
motor vehicle..., whether it was in motion or not, the peace 
officer may, by demand, require the person to comply with 
paragraph (a), in the case of a drug, ...:
(a) to perform forthwith physical coordination tests 
prescribed by regulation to enable the peace officer to 
determine whether a demand may be made under 
subsection (3) or (3.1) and, if necessary, to accompany 
the peace officer for that purpose.
Evaluation of Impaired Operation (Drugs and 
Alcohol) Regulations
s. 2 The physical coordination tests to be conducted under 
paragraph 254(2)(a) of the Criminal Code are the following 
standard field sobriety tests:
(a) the horizontal gaze nystagmus test;
(b) the walk-and-turn test; and
(c) the one-leg stand test.
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his ability to drive was affected by drugs).?First, in 
the driver’s view, the  officer was not entitled to rely 
on the results of the SFST to form his grounds that 
his ability to drive  was affected by a  drug. He 
suggested SFSTs results administered under s. 
254(2) of the Criminal Code  could only be used by 
an officer for the purposes of forming grounds for 
making a demand under s.?254(3), not for forming 
grounds under the MVA for a prohibition.?Second, 
even if the officer could use the SFST results, the 
driver argued that the officer did not have sufficient 
grounds to form his opinion.
The judge considered the purpose of s. 215 of the 
MVA. “The purpose of the section is to deter 
individuals from driving when their ability to drive 
a motor vehicle is impaired by drugs,” said the 
judge. “The focus is on the protection of society 
and the reduction of harm, rather than the 
individual rights of drivers.”
The judge concluded that the SFSTs were 
admissible  as evidence for the purposes of the  MVA 
prohibition that the  driver's ability to operate a 
motor vehicle  was impaired by a drug. In her view, 
just as the results of an Approved Screening Device 
(ASD) test authorized under the Criminal Code  can 
be used to form the requisite grounds to issue a 
regulatory driving prohibition under the MVA, so 
too can the results of SFSTs. 
The contention that the officer did not have 
sufficient grounds, even with the SFST results, was 
also rejected. The officer serving the  prohibition 
had sufficient indicia of impairment to form 
reasonable and probable grounds to issue it. “It is 
common sense to conclude that when a person 
exhibits the symptoms observed by the officer, and 
performs the tests in the way the  [driver] did, that 
he is not alert, able to respond quickly or follow 
directions, all of which would affect a driver's 
ability to safely operate a motor vehicle,” said the 
judge. The officer’s decision to issue the 24-hour 
prohibition was reasonable. The driver’s petition 
was dismissed.
British Columbia Court of Appeal
The dr iver appealed the 
dismissal of his judicial review 
petition. He again argued that 
the officer was not entitled to 
consider the results of the  SFST when forming his 
reasonable and probable grounds to issue the MVA 
prohibition on the basis his ability to drive was 
affected by a drug, other than alcohol. He 
maintained that the  SFST results could only  be used 
for determining whether a  demand may be made 
under the Criminal Code (ss.? 254(3) or 254(3.1)), 
not for purposes of the  MVA. He contended that the 
officer could only use powers expressly conferred 
by the MVA and the MVA made no mention of 
using SFSTs. 
SFST Admissibility
Justice Saunders, authoring the Appeal Court’s 
decision, rejected the accused’s submission. The 
information lawfully  gained from SFSTs could be 
used by the officer in exercising the statutory power 
given to police  under the MVA. There was nothing 
in the MVA? that restricted the use of the SFSTs to 
only a Criminal Code investigation:
As to the effect of the?Criminal Code?provision, 
I observe that standard field sobriety tests are 
simply a regulated, and perhaps improved, 
“[T]he standard field sobriety tests have a specific use in criminal proceedings but there 
is no prohibition on their use in the regulatory proceedings under the Motor Vehicle Act.”
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source of observations long used by police 
officers in the exercise of their statutory and 
common law duties as police constables. While 
s. 254(2)(a), establishes the threshold for a 
demand for blood tests (subsection 3) and for 
an evaluation (subsection 3.1), I do not 
understand it to have limited the use by police 
of such tests for other purposes.? That is,? s. 
254?may be the gateway to application of? ss. 
254(3)? and? (3.1)? but nothing in? s.? 254?makes 
that use of the tests exclusive to those purposes. 
… [T]he standard field sobriety tests have a 
specific use in criminal proceedings but there is 
no prohibition on their use in the regulatory 
proceedings under the? Motor Vehicle 
Act.?[reference omitted, para. 14]
Just as the police are entitled to utilize the results of 
an ASD for the purpose of imposing a 24-hour 
prohibition, they can use SFSTs in forming their 
opinion for the purposes of s. 215 of the MVA.
The driver’s appeal was dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
Editor’s Note: Additional facts taken from Kumar 
v. British Columbia  (Attorney General), 2017 BCSC 
803. The British Columbia  Court of Appeal also 
heard the  appeal of Dhillon v. British Columbia 
(Minister of Justice), 2018 BCCA 135 at the same 
time as? Kumar. In Dhillon, the British Columbia 
Supreme Court also dismissed a petition for judicial 
review of a 24-hour driving prohibition imposed for 
driving a motor vehicle while affected by a drug. It 
was also argued that the SFST results could not be 
used to establish reasonable and probable grounds 
to issue the prohibition. The Dhillon appeal was 
also dismissed for the same reasons in Kumar.
s. 10(a) HAS BOTH 
TEMPORAL & INFORMATIONAL 
ELEMENTS
R. v. Roberts, 2018 ONCA 411
After drinking heavily at a restaurant, 
the accused decided to drive  home. 
She was a psychologist who also 
instructed at the police  college. 
During her travels, she reached an 
intersection and pulled into the turning lane and 
waited at a green light for the oncoming traffic  to 
pass. After several cars went by, she turned left into 
the path of an oncoming car that she did not see. 
Three young women in the other car were injured, 
two of them seriously. One of the young women 
injured in the collision called 9-1-1 after the 
collision. 
On arrival, the attending police officer saw two 
damaged vehicles. After speaking to a paramedic 
already on scene, the officer believed the accused 
was the driver of one of the vehicles and that she 
could be impaired. The  officer approached the 
accused and spoke to her as she stood on a grassy 
boulevard with two other women. The accused said 
she was not injured, but was unable to explain how 
the collision occurred. She had difficulty forming 
complete sentences during a conversation about 
the events. Noting a slight odour of an alcoholic 
beverage on the accused’s breath, the officer asked 
her to walk back with him to his police car. The 
accused complied and the officer observed she 
appeared unsteady on her feet and she brushed into 
him twice during the walk on the dry, flat paved 
surface. 
The officer asked the accused to get in the back 
seat of the police car. She was reluctant. He told 
her he had to investigate the motor vehicle 
collision and was concerned with her safety as cars 
were driving by his police car. She got into the back 
seat of the police vehicle. The officer now noted a 
distinct odour of an alcoholic  beverage on the 
accused’s breath. She went on to tell the  officer she 
had just come from a restaurant where she drank 
two large beers. During the conversation her 
speech was slow, deliberate, and slightly  slurred. 
UNITED NATIONS
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The officer arrested the accused for “impaired 
operation of a motor vehicle.” She was read her 
rights to counsel, cautioned and given a breath 
demand. The accused was taken to the police 
station where she was told that she had been 
arrested for impaired operation of a motor vehicle 
and the police were concerned about the injuries 
of the other people involved. She said she 
understood that if anyone was hurt she could be 
held criminally responsible for those injuries. After 
she spoke to duty counsel she was turned over to a 
qualified breath technician. He noted her eyes 
were bloodshot, her breath smelled of a strong 
odour of alcohol, her balance was slow and 
careful, and she appeared to have soiled and wet 
her pants. The accused ultimately provided breath 
samples of 211 mg% and 201 mg%. She was 
initially  charged with impaired driving?and driving 
over 80 mg%. A few days later those charges were 
upgraded to two counts of impaired driving causing 
bodily harm and two counts of causing bodily harm 
while driving over 80mg%.
Ontario Superior Court of Justice
The accused testified that she felt she had 
no choice but to comply with the 
officer’s request for information. She 
argued, among other things, that she was 
not properly advised of the reasons for her 
detention under s. 10(a) of the Charter. 
Furthermore, the statements she  made to the police 
could not be used because she believed she was 
statutorily compelled to provide them, a s. 7 
Charter breach she claimed. She also submitted 
that without the statements she made, the  police 
did not have reasonable grounds to arrest her, 
which breached her s. 9 Charter right not to be 
arbitrarily detained and her s. 8 Charter right to be 
free from unreasonable search or seizure. Finally, 
she contended that she should have been advised 
of her s. 10(b) rights before  the officer conducted 
the informal sobriety test when he walked her back 
to his police car. In her view, the officer’s 
observations during this walk were inadmissible  as 
evidence of her impairment because she was 
conscripted to do it.
The judge rejected all of the accused’s Charter 
arguments. He did not believe the accused felt 
statutorily compelled to speak to the  officers. He 
found the  reason the accused chose to speak  to 
police was to curry favour with them by impressing 
them with her status as a  police  college 
instructor.? The judge found the officer had the 
necessary grounds for arrest, including the 
statements the  accused made and the officer’s 
observations which were not conscripted evidence. 
In the judge’s view, the officer asked the accused to 
accompany him to his police vehicle because of 
safety concerns, not for investigative purposes. A 
jury convicted the accused on two counts of 
impaired operation of a  motor vehicle causing 
bodily harm and two counts of causing bodily harm 
while driving over 80 mg%. The last two charges 
were conditionally stayed.?
Ontario Court of Appeal 
The accused appealed her 
convictions maintaining, in 
part, that her statements to 
p o l i c e w e r e s t a t u t o r i l y 
compelled, and that her rights under s. 10(a) had 
been breached. In her opinion, the responding 
officer failed to promptly notify her of the reason 
for her detention and failed to notify her of the 
actual extent of her jeopardy. As well, she 
submitted that the officer did not have reasonable 
grounds to arrest her without her inadmissible 
BY THE BOOK:
s. 199(1) Ontario’s Highway Traffic Act
s. 199(1) Every person in charge of a motor 
vehicle or street car who is directly or 
indirectly involved in an accident shall, if the 
accident results in personal injuries or damage 
to property apparently exceeding the amount 
prescribed by regulation, report the accident forthwith to 
the nearest police officer and furnish him or her with the 
information concerning the accident as may be required by 
the officer under subsection (3).
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statements. Finally, she claimed the trial judge 
erred in rejecting her assertion that the observations 
the officer made of her condition as she walked to 
the police car was conscripted evidence and could 
not be used as proof of her impairment in proving 
the offence.
Statements Statutorily Compelled?
Under s. 199(1) of Ontario’s Highway Traffic Act a 
person in charge of a  motor vehicle involved in an 
accident must report the accident and furnish 
information concerning the accident. Such 
compelled statements are not admissible in 
criminal proceedings for any purpose, including to 
incriminate an accused in relation to the contents 
of that statement or during a Charter  voir dire to 
establish whether an officer had reasonable 
grounds to make an arrest. These statutorily 
compelled statements will be excluded from 
evidence. However, the accused had the burden of 
establishing, on a balance of probabilities, that she 
gave the report on the basis of an honest and 
reasonably held belief that she was required by law 
to report the accident to the person to whom the 
report was given. 
The Court of Appeal concluded that the  trial judge 
did not err in rejecting the accused’s claim that she 
spoke to police out of a sense of statutory 
compulsion. “Where  statutory compulsion is 
claimed, the issue is not simply whether the driver 
who has spoken knows of the legal duty to report 
an accident,”  said Justice  Paciocco for the Appeal 
Court.  “The issue is whether the reason the driver 
spoke when they did was because they felt 
compelled by a legal obligation to do so. In this 
case, there was an ample evidentiary  foundation 
for the trial judge’s conclusion that [the accused’s] 
engagement with the police was motivated not by 
a sense of legal obligation, but by a  desire to 
influence their course of conduct by impressing 
them with her role as a police instructor. … The 
trial judge had ample reason for rejecting [the 
accused’s] statutory compulsion claim on the 
balance of probabilities.”
Reasonable Grounds?
Since the Court of Appeal ruled the accused’s 
statements were admissible, those statements, 
coupled with the other evidence in the case, 
provided reasonable grounds for the officer’ s belief 
that the accused’s ability to operate a motor vehicle 
was impaired by alcohol.
s. 10(a) – Reason for Detention
Under s. 10(a) of the Charter a  person arrested or 
detained must be informed promptly of the reasons 
therefor. “Breaches of s. 10(a) can be ‘temporal’ or 
‘informational’,”  said Justice  Paciocco. “A temporal 
breach occurs if an arrested or detained person is 
not promptly informed of the  reasons for their 
detention. An ‘informational’ breach arises if the 
reasons for their detention are not adequately 
communicated.”
A Temporal Breach?
The accused submitted that the 
officer failed to advise her of 
the reason for her detention 
before she was asked to 
accompany him to the police 
car. Because this issue was not 
raised at trial, the Appeal Court 
decided it was not a valid 
ground for appeal. Nevertheless, the Appeal Court 
found the temporal violation argument would not 
have been accepted in any event: 
[The accused’s] temporal breach argument was 
based primarily on the assumption that [she] 
was detained when [the officer] asked her to 
accompany him to the police vehicle. The 
evidence does not support this assumption. 
“Breaches of s. 10(a) can be ‘temporal’ or 
‘informational’. A temporal breach occurs 
if an arrested or detained person is not 
promptly informed of the reasons for 
their detention. An ‘informational’ breach 
arises if the reasons for their detention 
are not adequately communicated.”
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[The accused] was not physically restrained and 
she was under no legal obligation to comply 
with [the officer’s] request. Although a 
reasonable person in [the accused’s] position 
might well conclude that she had been 
deprived of her liberty when asked by a police 
officer to “walk with me back to my cruiser”, 
[she] clearly did not subjectively believe that 
she was being detained. She testified:
I understood he had an accident to 
investigate. I walked with him to the cruiser. 
I presumed that he’d be doing the same 
things to everybody else, the witnesses.
[ T h e a c c u s e d ] w a s t h e r e f o r e n o t 
psychologically detained. On the evidence 
before the trial judge, this is one of those 
interactions between the police and members 
of the public, “even for investigative purposes”, 
that does not constitute a detention within the 
meaning of the? Charter. [reference omitted, 
para. 66-67]
Moreover, even if the accused was detained when 
she was asked to walk  with the officer to his police 
car, the evidence would be admissible. “In my 
view it would damage the  repute of the 
administration of justice to exclude the evidence 
under s. 24(2) of the?Charter?based on a notional, 
rather than actual,? Charter? breach,” said Justice 
Paciocco. “[The officer] cannot be  expected to 
have advised [the accused] of the reason for her 
detention when she was not actually legally 
detained, and this notional breach would have no 
impact on her?Charter?protected interests.” 
An Informational Breach?
The accused claimed 
that the officer failed 
to adequately inform 
her of the reason for 
her arrest because he 
only  told her she was 
being arrested for the 
bas ic o f fence o f 
impaired driving as opposed to actual reason (ie. 
the aggravated offence of impaired driving causing 
bodily harm).?In her opinion, she should have been 
told she was being detained for impaired driving 
causing bodily harm from the outset. But this 
argument also was rejected, the Court of Appeal 
found the officer properly advised the accused of 
the reason for her detention and gave her adequate 
information relating to the extent of her jeopardy 
before she spoke to counsel:
It is important to understand that s. 10(a) 
applies if a person is either arrested or 
detained. One who is being arrested is, of 
course, being detained. A person can, however, 
be detained without being arrested. The statuses 
overlap, but are not identical. If someone is 
being arrested, it is imperative that they are told 
of the reasons for their arrest. … [para. 73]
And further:
Quite simply, if the police wants to use a 
person detained for one offence as a source of 
self-incriminating information relating to a 
different offence – including an aggravated 
form of the offence for which they have been 
detained – the police must tell the detainee this 
before proceeding. Indeed, they must tell the 
arrested detainee what they are being 
investigated for before they have been given 
their right to counsel. If the police interest in 
another offence arises after a detainee has been 
given an opportunity to consult counsel, the 
police must give the detainee another 
opportunity to consult counsel. 
[…]
Section 10(a) does not require that detainees be 
told of the technical charges they may 
ultimately face. A person will be properly 
“Section 10(a) does not require that 
detainees be told of the technical charges 
they may ultimately face. A person will be 
properly advised of the reason for their 
detention if they are given information 
that is sufficiently clear and simple to 
enable them to understand the reason for 
their detention and the extent of their 
jeopardy.” 
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advised of the reason for their detention if they 
are given information that is sufficiently clear 
and simple to enable them to understand the 
reason for their detention and the extent of their 
jeopardy. [references omitted, para. 76, 78] 
In this case, the officer complied with the  s. 10(a) 
requirements. He had informed the accused of her 
potential jeopardy of the more serious offence 
before she spoke to a lawyer. Therefore, she had 
adequate information about her legal jeopardy to 
meaningfully exercise her right to counsel and 
before police took any steps to use her as a source 
of evidence:
Specifically, [the officer] told [the accused] that 
she was being arrested for impaired operation 
of a motor vehicle. He was right to have done 
so, even if he suspected she may have 
committed the more aggravated offence of 
impaired driving causing bodily harm. On the 
evidence presented during the? voir dire, [the 
officer] did not have grounds to arrest [the 
accused] for the aggravated offence. He knew 
there had been a personal injury accident, but 
he had no objective basis for concluding that 
she caused the accident . I t was not 
immediately evident from the position or 
damage to the vehicles which driver, if any, had 
been at fault. An accident report had not yet 
been conducted. And [the accused] was unable 
to explain what happened. When he arrested 
her, [the officer] could have justifiably been 
criticized if he had told [the accused] she was 
being arrested for impaired driving causing 
bodily harm. The only grounds he had at the 
time related to the basic offence of impaired 
driving.?[para. 74]
And further:
Specifically, [the officer] told [the accused] 
shortly after they arrived at the station: “Okay. 
You’ve been arrested as a result of that, 
impaired operation of a motor vehicle. That’s 
been really our biggest concern right now is 
making sure that those people are gonna be 
Okay.” When she asked if she would be 
released in time to make her teaching 
engagement at the police college the next day, 
[the officer] stated: “Kim, I can’t make any 
other assurance, okay. We have to worry about 
the injuries at the hospital, okay.” When [the 
officer] attempted to make sure she understood 
what was happening, [the accused] said: “No, 
no. I understand that if anyone is hurt that, that 
crime….” In context, [the accused’s] comment 
was a clear acknowledgment that she knew she 
could be held responsible criminally if injuries 
were caused. [para. 79]
Observations: Conscripted Evidence?
The accused ’s 
assertion that the 
officer’s direction 
for her to walk to 
the police car in 
furtherance of his 
investigation was 
a consc r i p t ed 
sobriety test was 
dismissed. The 
observations made during this event could 
therefore be used as proof of guilt at trial. “Lawfully 
obtained evidence conscripted from a detainee 
through roadside sobriety testing is admissible to 
establish grounds for an arrest or detention, but 
such evidence is not admissible  as proof of actual 
alcohol consumption or impairment,” said the 
Appeal Court. “According to the law of Ontario, 
evidence is conscripted in the relevant sense only 
if the act directed by the officer is, itself, a 
sobriety test.”
In this case, the  accused was not “conscripted” to 
provide evidence when the officer asked her to 
walk  to the car. “In Ontario, a motorist is 
conscripted within the meaning of the rule only if 
the directed act itself? is? a sobriety test,”  said ?
Justice Paciocco. “If an officer directs a motorist to 
get out of their vehicle? as? a sobriety test, the 
observations cannot be admitted at trial to prove 
impairment. If an officer directs a motorist to get 
out of the car not as a sobriety test, but to 
facilitate further investigation, including gathering 
other information about sobriety through 
questioning once the driver is outside of the car, 
observations made of the motorist while exiting 
the car are admissible at trial to prove 
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impairment.” Here, the accused had not 
established that the officer asked her to accompany 
him for the purpose of observing her sobriety as she 
walked. “Even though the evidence does support 
the conclusion that [the officer] intended to 
conduct further investigation once they had 
walked to the police car, this falls short of what is 
required in Ontario. There was simply no evidence 
at the? Charter voir dire? that [the officer] had 
directed [the  accused] to walk so that he could test 
her sobriety while  walking. [The accused] has not 
shown, therefore, that she was compelled to 
participate in roadside testing as she walked to the 
police vehicle.” 
The accused’s appeal was dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
CAUTION    CAUTION   CAUTION    CAUTION   CAUTION   CAUTION
ONTARIO v. B.C.
The Ontario Court of Appeal noted a difference in its law about “conscription” and BC’s in relation to 
the admissibility of observations at trial to prove impairment. 
“In British Columbia, a motorist is conscripted within the meaning of 
this rule if they are directed to act for the purpose of assessing their 
alcohol consumption, even if the directed act itself is not a sobriety 
test … [The British Columbia Court of Appeal] explained that if an 
officer directs a  motorist to act for the purpose of investigating an 
alcohol offence, the motorist will have been conscripted, and 
observations made will not be available to prove guilt.” 
On the other hand, “in Ontario, a motorist is conscripted within the 
meaning of the rule only if the directed act itself is a sobriety test. … 
[The Ontario Court of Appeal] held that if an officer directs a motorist 
to get out of their vehicle as a sobriety test, the observations cannot be 
admitted at trial to prove impairment. If an officer directs a motorist to 
get out of the car not as a sobriety  test, but to facilitate further 
investigation, including gathering other information about sobriety 
through questioning once the driver is outside of the car, observations 
made of the motorist while exiting the car are admissible at trial to 
prove impairment.”
What this Means
If an officer in Ontario asks a driver to step out of their vehicle for the purpose of investigating alcohol 
consumption and thereby observes the driver stumble when doing so, the observation is admissible as 
proof of impairment at trial unless it is established that the driver was directed to exit their car so that 
their manner of exiting the car could be used as a sobriety test (see R. v. Brode, 2012 ONCA 140). If an 
officer in BC asks a driver to step out of their vehicle for the purpose of investigating alcohol 
consumption, observations made of the driver getting out cannot be admitted at trial as proof of 
impairment (see R. v. Visser, 2013 BCCA 393).
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US ATTORNEY GENERAL 
ENCOURAGES DEATH PENALTY 
FOR DRUG TRAFFICKERS
In a  March 2018 memo to all United States 
Attorneys, Attorney General Jeff Sessions provided 
guidance concerning the use of capital punishment 
in drug-related prosecutions. The  memo reads as 
follows:
The opioid epidemic  has inflicted an 
unprecedented toll of addiction, suffering, 
and death on communities throughout our 
nation. Drug overdoses, including overdoses 
caused by the lethal substance fentanyl and 
its analogues, killed more than 64,000 
Americans in 2016 and now rank as the 
leading cause of death for Americans under 
50. In the face of all of this death, we cannot 
continue with business as usual.
Drug traffickers, transnational criminal 
organizations, and violent street gangs all 
contribute substantially to this scourge. To 
combat this deadly epidemic, federal 
prosecutors must consider every lawful tool 
at their disposal. This includes designating an 
opioid coordinator in every district, fully 
utilizing the data analysis of the Opioid Fraud 
and Abuse Detection Unit, as well as using 
criminal and civil remedies available under 
federal law to hold opioid manufacturers and 
distributors accountable for unlawful 
practices.
In addition, this should also include the 
pursuit of capital punishment in appropriate 
cases. Congress has passed several statutes 
that provide the Department with the ability 
to seek capital punishment for certain drug-
related crimes. Among these  are statutes that 
punish certain racketeering activities (18 
U.S.C. § 1959); the use of a firearm resulting 
in death during a drug trafficking crime (18 
U.S.C. § 924(j)); murder in furtherance of a 
continuing criminal enterprise (21 U.S.C. § 
848(e)); and dealing in extremely large 
quantities of drugs (18 U.S.C. § 3591(b)(1)). 
I strongly encourage federal prosecutors to 
use these statutes, when appropriate, to aid 
in our continuing fight against drug trafficking 
and the destruction it causes in our nation."
PPSC & THE DECISION TO 
PROSECUTE
In the last issue of “In 
Service: 10-8” (Volume 
18 Issue 2) the BC 
Prosecution Service’s 
u p d a t e d c h a r g e 
assessment guidelines 
were examined. In this 
issue, the “Decision to Prosecute Test” of the 
Public Prosecution Service of Canada (PPSC) will 
be reviewed. The PPSC initiates and conducts 
federal prosecutions on behalf of the federal 
Crown. 
Decision to Prosecute Test
When deciding whether to initiate and conduct a 
prosecution on behalf of the federal Crown, PPSC 
counsel must consider two standards:
Is there  is a reasonable prospect of conviction 
based on evidence that is likely to be available at 
trial? 
Would a prosecution best serve the public 
interest?
EVIDENTIAL STANDARD
PUBLIC INTEREST STANDARD
Volume 18 Issue 3 - May/June 2018
PAGE 19
Evidential Standard
The evidentiary test is whether there is a 
reasonable prospect of conviction:
A reasonable prospect of conviction requires 
that there be more than a bare prima facie case, 
or in other words, it requires more than 
evidence that is capable of making out each of 
the necessary elements of the alleged offence 
against an accused. However, the test does not 
require a probability of conviction, that is, it 
does not require a conclusion that a conviction 
is more likely than not.
In determining whether this test is satisfied, 
Crown Counsel must consider the following 
factors: 
When assessing the evidence, Crown Counsel is to 
consider: 
• The availability, competence and credibility of 
witnesses and their likely impression on the 
trier of fact (ie. judge or jury);
• The admissibility of evidence implicating  the 
accused;
• Any defences that are  plainly  open to or have 
been indicated by the accused; 
• The existence  of a Charter violation that would 
undoubtedly lead to the exclusion of evidence 
essential to sustain a conviction; and 
• Any other factors which could affect the 
prospect of a conviction. 
The evidential standard must be applied throughout 
the proceedings, from the time the investigative 
report is first received until the exhaustion of all 
appeals.
Public Interest Standard
Crown counsel will only consider the public 
interest when satisfied that the evidentiary standard 
to support a charge has been met since it would 
never be in the public interest to prosecute if there 
was no reasonable prospect of conviction. 
However, just because there is sufficient evidence 
to support a charge does not necessarily mean a 
prosecution is required. If the Crown is satisfied 
that the evidential standard has been met, then the 
Crown must determine whether a prosecution 
would best serve the public interest.  
In assessing public interest, the PPSC Deskbook 
requires Crown Counsel to consider and weigh a 
number of factors relevant to any particular case.
The nature of the alleged offence.
• Its seriousness or triviality. The more serious the 
alleged offence, the more likely the public 
interest will require that a prosecution be 
pursued. However, where the alleged offence is 
not so serious as to plainly require a prosecution, 
Crown counsel must consider their duty  to 
uphold the laws enacted by Parliament and any 
important public interest served by conducting  a 
prosecution, for example ensuring compliance 
with a regulatory regime through prosecution;
• S i gn i f i c an t m i t i g a t i ng o r agg rava t i ng 
circumstances related to the  underlying conduct, 
for example  those set out in the Criminal Code or 
other Acts of Parliament;
• The prevalence and impact of the  alleged 
offence in the community  and the need for 
general and specific deterrence;
• The likely sentence in the event of a conviction;
• The delay between the commission of the 
alleged offence and the time of the charging 
decision. Considerations relevant to the impact 
of any delay include the responsibility of the 
accused for the delay, the discoverability of the 
alleged offence by the police or investigative 
agency, and the complexity and length of the 
investigation; and/or
• The law that is alleged to have been breached is 
obsolete or obscure.
The nature of the harm caused by or the 
consequences of the alleged offence.
• The nature of the harm includes loss or injury 
caused by the alleged offence and relevant 
consequences to the victim, the community, the 
environment, natural resources, safety, public 
health, public welfare or societal, economic, 
cultural or other public interests;
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• Whether the alleged offence engenders 
considerable concern in the community;
• The entitlement of any person to criminal 
compensation, reparation or forfeiture  if a 
prosecution occurs; and/or
• The availability of civil remedies is not a factor 
that militates against a prosecution.
The circumstances, consequences to and 
attitude of victims.
• The attitude of the victim of the alleged offence 
to a prosecution. This may include the attitude of 
the victim’s family members;
• The impact of the alleged offence on the victim 
and their family including any loss, injury or 
harm suffered;
• The youth, age, intelligence, vulnerability, 
disability, dependence, physical health, mental 
health, and other personal circumstances of the 
victim;
• Whether the victim was serving the public or 
was a public official; and/or
• Whether a  prosecution is likely to have an 
adverse effect on the victim's physical or mental 
health.
The level of culpability and circumstances of 
the accused.
• The accused’s degree of responsibility, level of 
involvement and whether they were in a position 
of authority or trust;
• The harm the accused caused, especially to 
vulnerable victims or other persons;
• The accused’s motivation, and in particular any 
bias, prejudice or hate based on race, national or 
ethnic origin, language, religion, gender, age, 
mental or physical disability, sexual orientation, 
or any other similar factor;
• The accused’s agreed upon co-operation with the 
investigation or prosecution of others, or the 
extent to which they have already done so;
• The accused’s age, intelligence, physical or 
mental health or infirmity; and/or
• The accused’s background, including their 
antecedents and the likelihood of future illegal 
conduct.
The need to protect sources of information.
Whether prosecuting would require or cause the 
disclosure of information that should not be 
disclosed in the public interest, for example would 
be injurious to:
• Confidential informants;
• Ongoing investigations;
• International relations;
• National defence; or
• National security.
Irrelevant criteria.
A decision whether to prosecute must not be 
influenced by any of the following:
• The race, national or ethnic origin, colour, 
religion, sex, sexual orientation, political 
associations, activities or beliefs of the accused 
or any other person involved in the investigation;
• Crown counsel’s personal feelings about the 
accused or the victim;
• Possible political advantage or disadvantage to 
the government or any political group or party; 
or
• The possible  effect of the decision on the 
personal or professional circumstances of those 
responsible for the prosecution decision.
Source: Public Prosecution Service of Canada Deskbook, Part II : 
Principles Governing Crown Counsel’s Conduct, 2.3 Decision to 
Prosecute, March 1, 2014.
PPSC Prosecutions by Offence Type
Source: Public Prosecution Service of Canada Annual Report 
2016-2017, accessed May 8, 2018.
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The number of Reports to 
Crown Counsel (RCCs) 
r e c e i v e d b y t h e B C 
Prosecution Service from investigative agencies in 
fiscal 2016/17. In these RCCs, there  were a total of 
76,368 accused persons . This was the  third year in 
a row for which there was growth in the number of 
RCCs received and was the  highest number of RCCs 
received since fiscal 2010/11.
Source: BC Prosecution Service, “Annual Report - 2016/17”, accessed April 15, 
2018. 
. . . a s a 
percentage 
of overall 
accused named in an RCC submitted to the BC 
Prosecution Service has declined over the last three 
years.  
Source: BC Prosecution Service, “Annual Report - 2016/17”, accessed April 15, 
2018. 
... were the  investigative agency 
most likely  to submit an RCC to 
the BC Prosecution Service. In 
fiscal 2016/17, police agencies submitted 57,294 
RCCs. This was followed by BC Corrections (13,728) 
a n d o t h e r i nve s t i g a t i v e 
agencies such as wildlife 
conservation, animal welfare, 
or financial or insurance 
agencies (1,942).
Source: BC Prosecution Service, “Annual 
Report - 2016/17”, accessed April 15, 2018. 
FACTS - FIGURES - FOOTNOTES
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The percentage of 
accused persons 
that were young 
persons (ages 12-17). In fiscal 
2016/17, the BC Prosecution 
Service approved to court 
63,733 accused persons. This 
consisted of 60,906 adults 
and 2,827 young persons.
Source: BC Prosecution Service, “Annual Report - 2016/17”, accessed April 
15, 2018. 
... was the BC Prosecution Services 
charge approval rate for RCCs 
submitted by investigative  agencies. 
Data extracted from the 73,050  people named in 
RCCs for which their was a final charge assessment 
decision made in fiscal 2016/17 resulted in an 
87% charge approval rate. 12% resulted in no 
charges and 1% were referred to alternative 
measures.
Source: BC Prosecution Service, “Annual Report - 2016/17”, accessed April 
15, 2018. 
The percentage of prosecutions 
resulting in a conviction by way of 
a guilty  plea or guilty verdict at 
trial. Of the 66,622 prosecutions concluded in 
2016/17, 60%  had a guilty finding, 1% were not 
guilty, 4%  entered into a recognizance to keep the 
peace, 34% had their charges stayed, and 1%  were 
concluded otherwise, such as a finding of unfit to 
stand trial or not criminally responsible  due to a 
mental disorder.
... was the most common reason why a prosecution 
was concluded with a Judicial Stay of Proceedings. 
In fiscal 2016/17 there was a total of 20 
prosecutions judicially stayed for a variety of legal 
reasons. Of those, 9  were stayed because of delay, 
down from 15 in fiscal 2015/16. Stays of 
proceedings directed by the BC Prosecution 
Service, on the other hand, totaled 22,528. About 
half of these  Crown stays resulted in other 
consequences for the accused including referrals to 
alternative measures, a peace bond or a  plea on 
another file.
Source: BC Prosecution Service, “Annual Report - 2016/17”, accessed April 
15, 2018. 
The time it 
takes for 
BC Crown 
Counsel to undertake a  charge assessment in most 
cases. From the date  a RCC is received until Crown 
Counsel makes a charge decision, 51% of cases 
take a  day. 59% of decisions are  made within 3 
days, 72% within 7 days, 83% within 15 days and 
91% within 30 days. 
Source: BC Prosecution Service, “Annual Report - 2016/17”, accessed April 
15, 2018.
The median number of 
days it takes for a file to 
conclude from the time an 
information is sworn or filed to the date that all 
charges on the file have a final disposition. 
Source: BC Prosecution Service, “Annual Report - 2016/17”, accessed April 
15, 2018.
4% ??
???
Adults Young Persons
87%
60%
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Source: BC Prosecution Service, “Annual Report - 2016/17”, accessed April 
15, 2018. 
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... are more likely to have lower 
confidence in the police than 
those that don’t use it. People 
who said they used cannabis on 
a daily basis, 37.6% of women 
and 34.1% of men, had low 
conf idence in the pol ice, 
compared to 5.7% of women 
and 8.5% of men who did not use cannabis in the 
last month. 
38.6% of people  using cannabis daily had a lower 
level of confidence in the criminal court system 
compared to 23.4% of those who did not use it in 
the last month. For women, the difference was 
more pronounced (non user at 21.3% vs. daily 
user at 46%). For men, there was no statistical 
difference in confidence levels in the justice system 
between those  that used cannabis (25.5%) or not 
(35.8%).
Those who use cannabis more frequently are more 
likely to report that they  have been victims of a 
violent crime. Only about 3.5% of people who did 
not use cannabis in the past month reported being 
violently victimized in the past year while 22% of 
daily users reported being violently victimized. 
Source: Insights on Canadian Society, Association between the frequency of 
cannabis use and selected social indicators, May 3, 2018.
Frequent Pot Users
Did not use in past month.
Used once a week or less.
Used 2 to 6 times per week.
Used every day.
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Proportion of people aged 15+ 
reporting they had 
low confidence in police
and frequency of cannabis use.
CONFIDENCE IN POLICE
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The value of 
drugs and 
p r o p e r t y 
seized as a 
result of Metro Vancouver’s 2017 Crime Stoppers 
program. The program received 5,597 tips in 2017 
which also resulted in 169 arrests.
Source: “2017 Results” [accessed May 5, 2018].
The number of arrests 
re su l t ing  f rom the 
Ontario Crime Stoppers 
program as at April 4, 2018. Other statistics over 
this same period of time included:
• 132 891 cases cleared:?
• $8,124,351 in rewards paid.
• $16,672,779 related to arson loss value.?
• $304,587,768 in property recovered.?
• $1,845,829,936 in seized drugs.
• $2,150,417,704  in total dollars recovered.?
Source: “Ontario Crime Stoppers” [accessed May 5, 2018].
According to the 
BC Cent re fo r 
Disease  Control 
(BCCDC) , one 
overdose death was estimated to be prevented for 
every 10 Take Home Naloxone (THN) kits that were 
used. And one overdose death was believed to be 
prevented for every 65 THN kits distributed. 
The BCDCC also 
estimated that a 
t o t a l o f 2 2 6 
overdose deaths 
were prevented 
in the first 10 
months of 2016. 
This amounts to 
26% of all possible overdose-deaths in BC being 
prevented by the THN program during this period. 
The BCDCC estimated that the THN kit program 
prevented 300 illicit drug overdose deaths between 
January 2012 and October 2016. This included an 
estimated 155 fentanyl-related overdose deaths 
prevented.
Source: “Estimated impact of the provincial take-home naloxone program on 
preventing illegal drug-related deaths in B.C., 2012-2106” , April 18, 2018.
The BCCDC 
reported that 
people who 
ove rdosed 
b e t w e e n 
January 1, 
2015 and November 30, 2016 tended to have more 
prescriptions for psychotropic substances 
(medications that have effects on the brain such as 
antidepressants and antipsychotics) than a 
randomly selected group of BC residents (control 
group). The  study also found that people overdosing 
during this period were more likely to have had a 
prescription of opioids for pain and to have used 
prescription opioids on a long-term basis at some 
point over the past five years.
Source: “Analyzing prescription drug histories among people who 
overdose” , February 21, 2018.
The BCCDC reported that a high proportion of 
people who overdosed from illegal drugs were 
highly engaged with the health care system in the 
year prior to their overdose. This engagement 
included emergency department visits, hospital 
admissions and/or appointments with community 
physicians. The study also showed that a large 
group of those overdosing left the emergency 
department without being seen by a doctor or left 
without medical advice. Only one in six people 
who overdosed did not visit the emergency 
department, hospital or community physician in the 
year before overdose. 
Source: “Analyzing patterns of health care utilization among people who 
overdose from illegal drugs in British Columbia” , March 7, 2018.
Source: “Responding to B.C.’s Illegal Drug Overdose Epidemic, Progress 
Update February/March 2018” , BC Ministry of Mental Health an Addictions 
p. 9-10.
$9,300,000
124,008
Psychotropic 
Substances
Naloxone 
Highly Engaged
“Drug checking ... has 
suggested that street heroin in 
the Downtown East Side does 
not actually contain any 
heroin at all, but rather 
caffeine, fillers, and fentanyl 
or fentanyl analogues.”
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• No response to stimuli
• Shallow, laboured or no breathing
• Cannot be woken up
• Snoring or gurgling
• Blue/grey lips or ﬁnger tips
• Floppy arms or legs
• Check for danger
• Call an ambulance and stay on the line
• Put the person in recovery position
• If you have access to narcan/naloxone, 
assemble the mini-jet or ampoule and 
inject into thigh or upper arm (if you 
have a nasal spray, spray into one side 
of the nasal canal)
• Provide CPR
• If there has been no response within 
3-5 minutes, and if you have it 
available, administer another dose  
of narcan/naloxone
??????????????
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WHAT ARE OPIOIDS?
Opioids is an umbrella term for natural or synthetic drugs that
are derived from – or related to – the opium poppy. 
Opioids attach to receptors in the central nervous system, reducing 
pain signals to the brain. Commonly used opioids include oxycodone, 
morphine, codeine, heroin, fentanyl, methadone and opium.
SIGNS OF OVERDOSE 
Opioids dull the senses, induce relaxation and euphoria. They
depress (slow down) breathing and the heart rate. 
In high doses, opioids depress the body’s natural urge to breathe. 
When someone is having an overdose they can stop breathing and 
may die. Even if a person does not die from overdose, they can
sustain brain damage.
Signs of overdose can include:
• No response to stimuli
• Shallow/stopped breathing
• Can’t be woken up 
• Unusual snoring/gurgling sounds 
• Blue/grey lips or ﬁnger tips 
• Floppy arms and legs
If you cannot get a response from someone, do not assume they
are asleep. Unusual or deep snoring is a common sign of overdose. 
Do not let people at risk ‘sleep it off’.
OVERDOSE RESPONSE
Sometimes it can take hours for someone to die from an opioid 
overdose. Action taken as soon as possible could save a life. If you
think someone has overdosed, knowing how to respond is crucial:
Check for vital signs:
A Alert: Not responding to voice?
B Breathing: Noisy? Shallow? Slow? Stopped? Strange snoring? 
C   Colour: For fair-skinned people, blue or pale lips or ﬁngertips?
For darker skinned people, grayish or ashen lips and skin colour.
If you see any of these signs, you should immediately move 
to activate the response plan for opioid overdose.
Before you act, check for dangers such as needles.
Call an ambulance, tell the operator your location, and stay 
on the line.
Try to get a response from the person by calling their name and/or
giving a sternal rub (rub your knuckles ﬁrmly across their sternum).
If you can’t get a response, put them in the recovery position 
allowing their airways to remain open.
If you HAVE narcan/naloxone:
1. Assemble the naloxone ready for use and
inject the full amount into the outer thigh 
or upper arm (or use nasal spray).
2. Record the time of administration. 
Provide this information to paramedics
when they arrive.
3. If the person is not breathing, apply rescue 
breathing (2 breathes every 5 seconds). 
4. If there has been no response after 3-5 
minutes, give another dose of naloxone.
Remember to record the time of 
administration.
Note: Naloxone will only temporarily 
reverse an overdose.
If you DO NOT HAVE narcan/naloxone:
• If the person is breathing, leave in recovery 
position and monitor breathing.
• If person is not breathing apply rescue
breathing and continue until:
– The person starts to breathe on their own
– Ambulance arrives
– Someone else can take over for you.
WHAT NOT TO DO IN THE EVENT  
OF A SUSPECTED OVERDOSE
• Do NOT leave the person alone.
• Do NOT give the person anything to eat
or drink, or try to induce vomiting.
 
3 1  A U G U S T
—
INTERNATIONAL  
OVERDOSE  
AWARENESS DAY 
For more information visit  
www.overdoseday.com
FA C T  S H E E T
Support face Place the
arm nearest to you at right
angles to the body. Place
their other hand against
their cheek.
Lift Leg Get hold of the
far leg just above the knee 
and pull it up, keeping the
foot ﬂat on the ground.
Roll over Keep their hand 
pressed against their cheek
and pull on the upper leg to 
roll them towards you and 
onto their side.
The Recovery Position
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ILLICT DRUG OVERDOSE 
DEATHS IN 2018
The Office of BC’s Chief Coroner has released 
statistics for illicit drug overdose deaths in the 
province from January 1, 2008 to April 30, 2018. 
In March there were  160 suspected drug overdose 
deaths. This represents a 24% increase  over the 
number of deaths occurring in March 2017 and a 
58% increase over February 2018. The March 2018 
statistics amount to about five (5) people dying 
every day of the month.
In April there were 124 suspected drug overdose 
deaths. This represents an 18% decrease over the 
number of deaths occurring  in April 2017 and a 
24% decrease over March 2018. The April 2018 
statistics amount to about four (4) people dying 
every day of the month.
There were a total of 511 illicit drug overdose 
deaths from January through April 2018. This is 42 
deaths less than last year’s total at this time.  
The 1,449  overdose deaths last year amounted to 
more than a 335% over 2013. Moreover, the report 
attributes fentanyl laced drugs as accounting for the 
increase in deaths. 
People aged 30-39 were  the hardest hit so far in 
2018 with 136  illicit drug  overdose deaths 
followed by 40-49 year-olds at 111  deaths. People 
aged 19-29 years-old had 110  deaths while those 
aged 50-59 had 108  deaths. Vancouver had the 
most deaths at 135  followed by Surrey (80), 
Victoria (39), Kamloops (17), Prince George (17) 
and Kelowna (15). 
Males continue to die at almost a 5:1 ratio 
compared to females. From January  to April 2018, 
409 males have died while there were 102 female 
deaths.
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The 2018 data indicates that most illicit drug 
overdose deaths (90%) occurred inside while 9% 
occurred outside. For six (6) deaths, the location 
was unknown. 
“Private residence” includes 
residences, driveways, garages, trailer homes.
“Other residence” includes hotels, motels, rooming 
houses, shelters, etc.
“Other inside” includes facilities, occupational sites, 
public buildings and businesses.
“Outside” includes vehicles, streets, sidewalks,  parks, 
wooded areas, campgrounds and parking lots.
DEATHS SINCE PUBLIC HEALTH 
EMERGENCY
In April 2016, BC’s provincial health officer 
declared a public health emergency in response to 
the rise in drug overdoses and deaths. The number 
of overdose deaths in the 25 months preceding the 
declaration (Mar 2014-Mar 2016) totaled 1,050. 
The number of deaths in the 25 months following 
the declaration (April 2016-April 2018) totaled 
2,732. This is an increase of 160%.
646
25
123
311
Private Residence
Other Residence
Other Inside
Outside
Unknown
Deaths by location: Jan-Feb 2018
Source: -Illicit Drug Overdose Deaths in BC - January 1, 2008 to 
April 30, 2018.  Ministry of Justice, Office of the Chief Coroner. 
June 7, 2018.
TYPES OF DRUGS
The top four detected drugs relevant to illicit drug overdose deaths from 2016 and 2017 were fentanyl, 
which was detected in 73.5% of deaths, cocaine (49.1%), methamphetamine/amphetamine (31.8%), and 
heroin (25.6%). 
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?Illicit Drug Overdose Deaths in BC, Jan-Apr 2018
 Coroners Service
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LEGALLY SPEAKING: FENTANYL
“The classic meaning of ‘perdition’ is a state of eternal punishment and 
damnation into which a sinful and unpenitent person passes, after 
death. The modern usage is more secular in nature, and suggests 
perdition is a place of utter disaster, ruin, or destruction. Where the 
illicit use of fentanyl is concerned, perdition is precisely the correct 
term for the ultimate destination of purveyors and users of this 
substance.”
R. v. Fyfe, 2017 SKQB 5 
“Once an insidious killer of opioid users, 
the drug?fentanyl?has emerged to 
become a notorious 
Grim?Reaper?stalking the streets of 
Canada’s cities and towns. Anyone 
reading or watching the news 
understands that?fentanyl?use has 
become a serious public health crisis ...”  
R. v. Toth, 2017 BCSC 501
“Those who traffic in opiates, 
cocaine, and synthetic drugs such 
as methamphetamines have long 
been described by the courts as 
‘Merchants of Misery’.? I think it is 
now apt to describe those who 
traffic in?fentanyl?as ‘Merchants of 
Death’.”? 
R. v. Joon, 2017 BCPC 301
“[F]entanyl?is a?scourge. It poses intolerable risks of accidental overdosing because 
it is so much more powerful than morphine. Illegally manufactured?fentanyl?can 
be particularly and unpredictably potent, even tiny amounts of?fentanyl?mixed 
into other drugs such as cocaine or heroin may be fatal.”
 R. v. Smith,?2017 BCCA 112
“In the context of the illicit drug scene in Canada at this time and the ever-present 
possibility that a powder or pill being sold may contain some amount of?fentanyl, 
it seems to me that sellers, buyers and users of most kinds of illicit drugs are 
placing themselves in a situation not that dissimilar from their pointing a gun and 
firing it without knowing if it’s loaded, not unlike the dangerous game of chance 
called Russian?roulette.? The consequences of involvement in the illegal drug 
trade are now potentially fatal. “
R. v. Joumaa, 2018 ONSC 317
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“Trafficking?in?fentanyl?is almost the equivalent of putting multiple 
bullets in the chambers of a revolver and playing Russian?roulette. It 
is the most efficient killer of drug users on the market today. Its 
danger to users is greater than cocaine and heroin.” 
R. v. Frazer, 2017 ABPC 116
“Anyone who is       
involved in 
trafficking?fentanyl?must 
now understand that they 
are dealing with a drug 
that is no different than 
playing Russian?Roulette.”
?R. v. Ormonde, 2018 ONSC 1295
“The use of the incredibly 
dangerous drug?fentanyl?to 
increase the potency of heroin has 
elevated this impact to the point 
where heroin users are effectively 
playing Russian roulette when they 
use heroin and traffickers, even if 
they do not put the bullet in the 
chamber, are handing users the 
gun.”
 R. v Abraham, 2017 BCSC 2463 
Volume 18 Issue 3 - May/June 2018
PAGE 34
Canadian Association of Police Educators
The Canadian Association of Police Educators (CAPE) promotes excellence in law enforcement 
training and education through the guidance of innovative research, program development, 
knowledge transfer, network facilitation, and collaborative training initiatives. The objectives of 
CAPE include:
• Providing advice and input regarding national and regional law enforcement training and 
education trends/needs.
• Advocating and promoting the commitment to training.
• Advising on training specific policy.
• Liaising between operational training academies and academic institutions.
• Guiding and undertaking law enforcement training and education research.
• Coordinating knowledge transfer initiatives.
Presentation topics at the 2018 CAPE Conference include:
✓ Police Research in Canada
✓ Professionalization of Policing
✓ Applying rResearch on Targeted Violence to the Practice of Threat Management in 
Communities: A US Perspective
✓ Problem Based Learning for Policing
✓ Practical Applications of Police Use of Force Research
✓ Evidence Based Policing
✓ Simulators and Bridging the Gap Between Research and Police Training
This conference also provides an opportunity to network and exchange ideas.
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UTTERANCE WAS VOLUNTARY & 
SPONTANEOUS: 
NO s. 10(b) CHARTER BREACH
R. v. Brazeau, 2018 ABCA 170
At about 12:30 am, a masked man 
armed with a knife entered a  Mac’s 
convenience store and demanded 
money. He left with a few $5 and $10 
bills and toonies. He was seen getting 
into a grey truck. Police responded and saw a grey 
truck driving quite fast. After a  lengthy chase, police 
were unable to catch the truck and lost sight of it 
but soon discovered it in a ditch. The accused was 
found lying injured next to 
the truck, near the passenger 
d o o r. H e m a t ch e d t h e 
description of the robber. He 
was belligerent, smelled of 
alcohol and had slurred 
speech. He was arrested and 
advised of his right to counsel 
and cautioned. He indicated 
he wanted to speak to a 
lawyer at the “cop shop”. 
An ambulance was called and he was transported 
to the hospital at 2:14 am. A search of the truck 
revealed $5 and $10 bills and toonies, as well as 
two knives, but no mask. A blood demand was 
made at the hospital at 4:29 am at which time the 
accused was again asked if he wanted to contact a 
lawyer. He again declined, stating that he would 
contact counsel later. When the medical staff 
decided that they would not discharge the accused 
from the hospital that night, the police decided to 
release him on a promise to appear. In the process 
of releasing the accused, he voluntarily apologized 
for his driving  and for endangering the  police 
officers’ lives. He also commented that he would 
fight the robbery charge because “it’s just not like 
me”. The accused was never taken back to the 
police station and was never questioned by the 
officers. He was charged with several offences 
including robbery, dangerous driving, flight from 
police and impaired driving.
Alberta Provincial Court
A police officer testified that the accused 
could have been left in the trauma room 
to use the phone after about 4:19 am. 
But before that time, the accused could 
not be left alone to make a phone call because he 
was immobilized on a  spine  board, although the 
officer did say he might have been able to do so on 
“speaker phone”.? The judge found the two 
statements the accused made were spontaneous 
utterances to the  police. They were unsolicited and 
volunteered, not sought. The police did not 
question the accused or attempt to elicit any 
evidence from him. The judge concluded neither 
utterance was the product of a? Charter? breach. 
Those statements, apologizing for endangering the 
officers’ lives (which amounted to an admission he 
was driving the truck) and that he  would fight the 
robbery charge because “it’s just not like me”, were 
admitted. 
As for s. 10(b), the  judge ruled that the first time 
police were able to give the accused private 
telephone access was 4:19 am at the hospital, but 
the accused declined. Moreover, he was not 
otherwise  questioned. The accused was convicted 
of robbery, failing to stop for police, dangerous 
driving, and impaired driving.?
Alberta Court of Appeal 
The accused argued, in part, 
that the trial judge erred by 
applying the wrong test in his 
s. 10(b) analysis. In his view, 
the police  had a duty to hold off when the 
utterances were made and failed to provide him 
with the opportunity to contact counsel.
s. 10(b) Charter
The Court of Appeal upheld the  trial judge’s s. 10(b) 
ruling. The accused had been given the opportunity 
to contact counsel and declined to do so. And the 
police did nothing to elicit the statements. “There 
was no attempt to elicit evidence at any time,”  said 
the Appeal Court. “Given this finding, the only 
conclusion was there was no s 10(b) violation of 
the requirement to hold off.”?
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As for the contention that the police failed to 
provide the accused with a reasonable  opportunity 
to contact counsel, it too was rejected. The accused 
declined the opportunity to contact counsel both at 
the scene and when asked again at the hospital. 
“No evidence  was elicited at the hospital,”  said the 
Court of Appeal. “The utterances, which were 
essentially apologies to the police, were made 
when the [accused] was released on a promise to 
appear.”
The Court of Appeal noted:
[T]he police have a positive obligation to 
facilitate contact with counsel and any delay in 
doing so must be justified. Merely being in a 
hospital does not negate that. … [T]here may 
be logistical impediments. However, the police 
have a duty to take reasonable steps to 
determine whether there is a place where the 
necessary privacy is available while still 
allowing police to control the detained person. 
[references omitted, para. 21]
In this case, the delay in providing the accused 
with an opportunity to contact counsel was 
reasonable in the circumstances. He was asked at 
the accident scene is he wished to contact counsel. 
He indicated he would wait until at the  police 
station. ?He was then transported by ambulance to 
the hospital where he  was again advised he could 
contact a lawyer after being read the blood demand 
but he again declined. Up until this time, the 
officer said the accused could not have been left 
alone to make a phone call because he was 
immobilized on a spine board. In finding the delay 
reasonable, the Appeal Court stated:
Having regard to the state the [accused] was in, 
plus his earlier disinclination to contact 
counsel at the earliest possible moment, it is 
difficult to conclude that the delay of 
approximately one and half hours while the 
[accused] was being actively treated and 
getting x-rays was unreasonable in the 
circumstances, and the trial judge reasonably 
concluded as such. In any event, no evidence 
was elicited during that time. Before the police 
sought the blood sample, the [accused] was 
again asked if he wished to contact counsel 
and declined. None of the impugned evidence 
was elicited at that time. It was only when the 
[accused] was being released that he made the 
admitted utterances.?[para. 23]
Further, the police held off from eliciting evidence 
from the accused. They did not question him. It 
wasn’t until police were releasing him on a  promise 
to appear that he voluntarily  apologized for 
endangering their lives. The voluntary unsolicited 
spontaneous utterances made by the accused were 
admissible.
The accused’s appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
INDUCEMENT BY ITSELF DOES 
NOT RENDER STATEMENT 
INVOLUNTARY
R. v. Dixon, 2018 BCCA 181
The accused was arrested by police 
following a sexual assault in which the 
victim was administered GHB. The 
circumstances of the offence were 
violent and involved choking. The accused forced 
himself upon the  victim despite her repeated 
attempts to stop him. Some hours later, the victim 
made a police report.
After his arrest on the sexual assault charge, the 
police told him he might be released in a few 
hours. The police also said that the matter might be 
resolved here and now if the accused made a 
“[T]he police have a positive obligation to facilitate contact with counsel and any delay in 
doing so must be justified. Merely being in a hospital does not negate that. … [T]here 
may be logistical impediments. However, the police have a duty to take reasonable steps 
to determine whether there is a place where the necessary privacy is available while still 
allowing police to control the detained person.”
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statement. The accused did provide a  statement and 
he was subsequently released from custody on an 
undertaking. The accused, along with another man 
involved in the incident, was charged with sexual 
assault and administering a noxious substance 
(GHB) with intent to cause bodily harm. 
British Columbia Provincial Court
The Crown sought to use the accused’s 
statement at trial to cross-examine him 
for the purpose of es tabl i shing 
inconsistencies between what he told 
the police and his testimony at trial. The accused 
argued that the statement he made to police was 
not voluntary because  he was induced into 
providing it. But the judge disagreed and found the 
accused’s statement was freely and voluntarily 
made. He went on to reject the accused’s evidence 
that the  sex was consensual and convicted him on 
the sexual assault charge. His co-accused was 
found guilty of sexual assault and administering the 
GHB.
British Columbia Court of Appeal
The accused challenged his 
conviction maintaining, among 
other things, that the Crown 
failed to prove his statement to 
police was voluntary beyond a 
reasonable doubt. He again contended that he was 
offered two inducements to make the statement:
• The police said he might be released in a  few 
hours; and 
• The police said the matter might be resolved 
here and now if he made a statement.
The Court of Appeal, however, rejected the 
accused’s claims. “The offering of an inducement 
does not, by itself, make a statement involuntary,” 
said Justice Tysoe, speaking for the Appeal Court. 
“It is necessary to look at all of the circumstances 
to determine whether there is a reasonable doubt 
as to whether the will of the person has been 
overborne so that the statement cannot be 
regarded as having been voluntarily given.”  In this 
case, the Court of Appeal found no quid pro quo 
was offered: 
In the present case, the [accused] was not 
offered a?quid pro quo?in exchange for making 
the statement. While the [accused] was told 
that he might be released later that afternoon, it 
was not offered as a?quid pro quo. The remark 
was made independently of whether the 
[accused] did or did not give a statement.
LEGALLY SPEAKING:
Statement Voluntariness:
“[C]ourts must remember that the 
police may often offer some kind of 
inducement to the suspect to obtain 
a confession. Few suspects will 
spontaneously confess to a crime. In the vast 
majority of cases, the police will have to somehow 
convince the suspect that it is in his or her best 
interests to confess. This becomes improper only 
when the inducements, whether standing alone or in 
combination with other factors, are strong enough to 
raise a reasonable doubt about whether the will of 
the subject has been overborne. … The most 
important consideration in all cases is to look for 
a quid pro quo offer by interrogators, regardless of 
whether it comes in the form of a threat or a 
promise.” – Supreme Court of Canada Justice 
Iacobucci in R. v. Oickle, 2000 SCC 38.
“The offering of an inducement does not, by itself, make a statement involuntary. It is 
necessary to look at all of the circumstances to determine whether there is a reasonable 
doubt as to whether the will of the person has been overborne so that the statement 
cannot be regarded as having been voluntarily given.”
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Similarly, the police did not offer the?quid pro 
quo? that the [accused] might not be charged if 
he gave a statement. The police officer was 
simply explaining to the [accused] that he was 
trying to find the truth and commented that, if 
the matter got resolved then it would end there, 
and that if a charge was laid it would end up in 
court. The comments of the officer could not 
reasonably be interpreted as a suggestion that 
the [accused] may not be charged if he 
provided a statement, especially in view of the 
fact that he had already agreed to answer 
questions from the police. [para. 24-25]
The accused failed to demonstrate that the trial 
judge erred in concluding the Crown had 
established the voluntariness of the statement. The 
accused’s appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
WELL SAID JUDGE
“IT’S NOT A JOB, FOLKS.
IT’S A CALLING”
On April 10, 2018 the the Honourable Associate 
Justice William W. Bedsworth of Fourth District 
Court of Appeal delivered the keynote address 
during the grand opening of Golden West College’s 
Criminal Justice Training Center in Huntington 
Beach, California. Here is an excerpt from his 
speech:
“Law enforcement changes hourly, folks. It 
is no easier to keep up with the changes in 
law enforcement than it is to keep up with 
changes in medicine or physics or biology 
or ballistics or pharmacology. All of which, 
by the way, are things the modern police 
officer must know a lot about — must learn 
and relearn constantly.”
...
“Every day, every time a cop picks up a 
paper or watches the news, she learns about 
something else she will have to know about 
probably before her next shift. The amount 
of education and reeducation our police 
must assimilate every day is staggering. It 
requires literally, and I emphasize, I mean 
this literally, not figuratively, it requires 
literally more daily re-education than a 
doctor or lawyer ever needs to do his or her 
job, and when a peace officer applies that 
reeducation, he or she has to be a 
psychologist, a pharmacologist, a teacher, a 
counselor, a lawyer, an EMT, and a bad-ass 
superhero, probably all during one shift.”
...
“Imagine doing what you do. I don’t know 
what your job is. Whatever your job is, 
imagine doing it with people throwing rocks 
at you, people spitting on you, people trying 
to kill you, and then think about what their 
job description is.
Their job description, these people in 
uniform, is putting your life on the line 
every day for strangers, dealing with the 
mentally ill, mediating domestic violence, 
counseling child molestation victims, 
consoling the bereaved, pulling people out 
of burning vehicles, chasing psychopathic 
15-year-olds down blind, dark alleys, 
knowing they have a gang (and) gun, but 
they don’t yet have a conscience.”
...
“It’s not a job, folks. It’s a calling, and if you 
haven’t been called, you can’t understand 
those who have been. So, I no longer try to 
understand them. I just thank the Lord for 
continuing to turn them out and I suggest 
you do the same.”
Complete keynote available here.
“Quid pro quo” is a Latin phrase literally 
meaning “something for something.”
“The amount of education and reeducation our police must assimilate every 
day is staggering. ... [I]t requires literally more daily re-education than a 
doctor or lawyer ever needs to do his or her job.”
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ADMINISTRATIVE ALCOHOL & 
DRUG RELATED DRIVING 
PROHIBITIONS
B C ’s I m m e d i a t e 
Roadside Prohibition 
(IRP) program was 
introduced in 2010. 
Under this program, 
police may issue a?3, 
7, 30 or 90-day 
prohibition at the 
roadside to alcohol-affected drivers under B.C.’s 
Motor Vehicle Act. 
A police officer will issue an IRP when a driver has 
care or control of a motor vehicle, and following a 
demand to provide a breath sample on an 
Approved Screening Device (ASD): 
• if the driver has a blood alcohol concentration 
over 0.05 (50mg%) BAC (the “Warn” range) 
• if the driver has a blood alcohol concentration 
over 0.08 (80mg%) BAC (the “Fail” range) 
• if the driver fails or refuses to comply with a 
breath test without a reasonable excuse. 
For the 3 or 7 day  IRP, a police officer may decide 
to impound the driver’s vehicle. For 30 or 90 day 
IRP’s, vehicle impoundment is mandatory.  
Administrative Driving Prohibitions
An Administrative Driving Prohibition (ADP) is a 90 
day driving prohibition served on drivers who 
provide a breath test into an approved instrument 
such as an Intoxilyzer. 
If a  driver’s breath sample indicates a BAC above 
0.08 (80mg%), or if the driver refuses to provide a 
sample of breath, police may issue a  90-day 
“Notice of Driving Prohibition” and may also 
charge the driver under the Criminal Code. A driver 
served with an ADP has a 21-day period before the 
prohibition takes effect. 
WARN
BAC .05 - .08
1st incident
3 days
3 days
(officer discretion)
$200
WARN
BAC .05 - .08
2nd incident
within 5 years
7 days
7 days
(officer discretion)
$300
WARN
BAC .05 - .08
3rd incident
within 5 years
30 days
30 days
$400
FAIL
BAC over .08
90 days
30 days
$500
or REFUSE
ASD Result
Incident
IRP Length
Vehicle Impound 
Length
Administrative 
penalty
IMMEDIATE ROADSIDE PROHIBITIONS
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BC’s ALCOHOL DRIVING PROHIBITIONS
Immediate Roadside Prohibitions Administrative Driving Prohibitions
Warn 90 Days 90 Days Total
IRP &
YEAR 3 day
IRP
7 day
IRP
30 day
IRP
FAIL REFUSE Total
IRP
FAIL REFUSE Total
ADP
  
ADP
2013 6,063 303 26 11,565 1,410 19,367 1,017 341 1,358 20,725
2014 5,701 368 26 11,238 1,470 18,803 1,048 352 1,400 20,203
2015 4,670 351 33 9,286 1,863 16,203 1,125 480 1,605 17,808
2016 4,585 333 33 8,853 1,830 15,634 1,124 463 1,587 17,221
2017 4,243 259 19 8,389 1,715 14,625 1,068 419 1,487 16,112
VEHICLE IMPOUNDMENTS
BC’s Vehicle  Impoundment (VI) Program is a road safety  initiative 
permitting police to immediately impound vehicles operated by drivers 
affected by alcohol. Drivers served with an IRP may see the vehicle they 
were driving impounded for 3, 7 or 30 days, depending  on the 
prohibition length. VI’s may also be issued for prohibited, suspended 
and unlicensed drivers; excessive speeders; stunt drivers and street 
racers; and improperly seated motorcyclists.
BC’s REVIEWS FOR ALCOHOL DRIVING PROHIBITIONS
Immediate Roadside Prohibitions Administrative D
Prohibitions
riving 
Warn 90 Days 90 Days
YEAR Appeals Successful % 
Successful
Appeals Successful % 
Successful Appeals Successful
%
Successful
2013 198 47 24% 2,909 768 26% 232 69 30%
2014 211 71 34% 2,877 1,061 37% 247 76 31%
2015 159 55 35% 2,756 1,283 47% 340 155 46%
2016 168 29 17% 2,825 848 30% 325 138 42%
2017 162 29 18% 2,726 670 25% 360 137 38%
Source: Alcohol Driving Prohibitions
Source: Reviews For Alcohol Prohibitions
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BC VEHICLE IMPOUNDMENTS
TYPE 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 5 Year Total
BAC - WARN - 3 day VI 3,298 2,799 2,305 2,432 2,354 13,188
BAC - WARN - 7 day VI 246 258 236 217 188 1,145
BAC - WARN - 30 day VI 70 76 77 43 33 299
BAC - FAIL/Refuse - 30 day VI 12,586 12,244 10,767 10,304 9,727 55,628
Prohibited/Suspended - 7 day VI 2,529 2,490 2,428 2,211 2,196 11,854
Prohibited/Suspended - 30 day VI 768 748 732 664 591 3,503
Prohibited/Suspended - 60 day VI 260 246 206 199 186 1,097
Unlicensed - 7 day VI 2,020 1,876 1,765 1,526 1,441 8,628
Unlicensed - 30 day VI 217 199 156 151 136 859
Unlicensed - 60 day VI 30 47 34 32 31 174
Excessive Speed - 7 day VI 6,536 6,394 6,871 7,127 5,871 32,799
Excessive Speed - 30 day VI 257 296 285 302 239 1,379
Excessive Speed - 60 day VI 37 40 27 24 25 153
Race - 7 day VI 55 73 62 52 43 285
Race - 30 day VI 7 3 2 2 2 16
Stunt - 7 day VI 189 189 192 187 134 891
Stunt - 30 day VI 9 9 8 17 13 56
Stunt - 60 day VI 3 0 0 0 0 3
Sitting - 7 day VI 0 2 0 0 1 3
Multiple Reasons - 7 day VI 298 277 389 1,442 1,736 4,142
Multiple Reasons - 30 day VI 358 424 372 515 505 2,174
Multiple Reasons - 60 day VI 21 21 21 49 62 174
TOTAL 29,794 28,711 26,935 27,496 25,514 138,450
Source: Vehicle Impoundments
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BC’s WORKERS COMPENSATION 
ACT NOW HAS PRESUMPTIVE 
CAUSE PROVISION
A new mental disorder 
presumption has been 
added to BC’s Workers 
Compensation Act that 
provides compensation 
for workers employed in 
certain occupations who 
have developed a disease or disorder, including 
PTSD, associated to their work. It will apply 
specifically  to first responders: firefighters, police, 
paramedics, sheriffs and correctional officers. 
Under the new legislative amendment, the mental 
condition is presumed to have arisen due to the 
nature of the  claimant’s work, unless the contrary  is 
proved. With a presumptive condition, there is no 
longer a need to prove that a claimant’s disease or 
disorder is work related.
Previously, workers in these  occupations had to 
provide medical and/or scientific evidence to 
establish that the condition arose out of their 
employment, in addition to a diagnosis by a 
psychiatrist or psychologist.
In short, the legislative amendment establishes a 
new mental disorder presumption when the 
condition is a reaction to traumatic events at work. 
BC’s Workers Compensation Act
Mental disorder
5.1 (1.1) If a worker who is or has been employed in an eligible occupation
(a) is exposed to one or more traumatic events arising out of and in the course of the worker's employment in that 
eligible occupation, and
(b) has a mental disorder that is recognized, in the most recent American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, at the time of the diagnosis of the mental disorder under subsection (1) (b) of this 
section, as a mental or physical condition that may arise from exposure to a traumatic event,
the mental disorder must be presumed to be a reaction to the one or more traumatic events arising out of and in the 
course of the worker's employment in that eligible occupation, unless the contrary is proved.
[...]
(4) In this section:
"correctional officer" means a correctional officer as defined by regulation of the Lieutenant Governor in Council;
"eligible occupation" means the occupation of correctional officer, emergency medical assistant, firefighter, police 
officer, sheriff or, without limitation, any other occupation prescribed by regulation of the Lieutenant Governor in Council;
"emergency medical assistant" means an emergency medical assistant as defined in section 1 of the Emergency 
Health Services Act;
"firefighter" means a member of a fire brigade who is
 (a) described in paragraph (c) of the definition of "worker" or employed by the government of Canada, and
(b) assigned primarily to fire suppression duties whether or not those duties include the performance of ambulance or 
rescue services;
"police officer" means an officer as defined in section 1 of the Police Act; 
[...]
"sheriff" means a person lawfully holding the office of sheriff or lawfully performing the duties of sheriff by way of 
delegation, substitution, temporary appointment or otherwise.
NEW PRESUMPTIVE CAUSE PROVISION
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SYMBOL FUNCTION ILLUSTRATION INFORMATION
Master light switch Manually selects the different lighting options of your vehicle.
Daytime running 
lights
Makes vehicle more visible during the day.
• Turn on when headlights are off.
• Do not provide enough light on the 
road ahead of your vehicle when it 
is dark out.
Headlight
lower beam
(low beam, passing
beam, dipped beam)
Lights up the road just in front of 
your vehicle.
???
???
???
Use: 
• In urban areas with lit streets.
• When following or approaching 
oncoming vehicles. 
Headlight
upper beam
(high beam, driving
beam, main beam)
Lights up a longer distance, allowing you
to see far down a dark road.   
???
??? ????  
Use:
• In rural areas.
Switch off when:  
• Another car is coming towards 
or is driving in front of you.
• Driving in fog, rain or snow as 
light from your upper beams 
?????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????
the road and obstacles in front of 
the vehicle.
   
   
or
Automatic upper 
beam
Automatically switches off upper beam 
???????????????????????????????????????
there is a vehicle ahead. 
Ensures that your lights do not cause 
glare for other drivers. 
   
  or
Automatic 
headlights
Automatically switches headlights and 
marking lights on or off according to the 
amount of light outside the vehicle.
Ensures that your headlights and 
marking lights are on when you 
need them.
   
Front fog lights
Provides better view of the road in fog, as 
they have a wide beam pattern to light up 
the road directly in front of your vehicle. 
Use if driving in fog or snow.
   
Rear fog lights
Makes your vehicle more visible to drivers 
behind you in fog, as they are brighter than 
tail lights.
Use only if driving in fog, rain or snow 
as it can be confused with stop lights 
and distract other drivers.
   
Marking lights
Activates front position lights, rear position 
lights (tail lights), side marker lights and 
licence plate lights.
Make your vehicle more visible 
to others.
www.tc.gc.ca/SEEandbeSEEN
Note: Marking lights are off.
Note:  Headlights are off.
??????????????????????????????????????
Make sure you can see the road and other road users – 
and others can see you! Keep your lights clean and in 
good working condition. Make sure your headlights are 
aimed properly. 
Turn your headlights on when:
• ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
dark tunnel).
• ?????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
when to use them.
????????
???????? ??????????????????????????
??????
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January 15, 2019 
In Person or Webcast                             Click here.
February 8, 2019 
In Person or Webcast                             Click here.
March 4, 2019    Optional Workshop: Macrh 5, 2019
In Person or Webcast                             Click here.
April 13, 2019 
In Person or Webcast                             Click here.
UPCOMING         
EXTERNAL LEARNING 
OPPORTUNITIES
July 18, 2018 
Webcast                                       Click here.
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Recently Added Osgoode Program On Demand
Recorded: April 19, 2018.          Click here
For More of Osgoode’s Best Selling On Demand and Upcoming Online Programs 
Visit here.
2018 BC LAW ENFORCEMENT 
MEMORIAL SERVICE
Sunday, September 30, 2018
BC Legislature, Victoria, BC
April 26, 2019 
In Person or Webcast                             Click here.
Parade participants to form up at 12:00 pm in the 700 block of Wharf Street.
Parade will step off at 12:40 pm.
OFFICERS BEING HONOURED
Constable John 
Davidson,
Abbotsford 
Police 
Department
End of Watch: 
November 6, 
2017
Constable Ian 
Jordan,
Victoria 
Police 
Department
End of Watch: 
April 11, 
2018
click here for 
more info
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FACIAL ERROR SHOULD HAVE 
BEEN NOTICED: WARRANT 
INVALIDATED
R. v. Campbell, 2018?NSCA?42
?
Utilizing the tele-warrant procedures, 
a police officer prepared an ITO for a 
warrant to search a home. The officer 
set out his reasonable grounds for 
believing there was evidence related to several 
indictable offences in the accused’s home and 
included the time in which the warrant could be 
executed. A justice of the peace authorized the 
search warrant. On its face, the justice directed 
“This warrant may be executed between the  hours 
of 6:00 p.m. on the 7th?day of May, 2016 and 9:00 
p.m. on the 7th?day of January, 2016.” The warrant 
was executed by police and the accused was 
charged with unlawfully producing cannabis, two 
counts of possessing a firearm while prohibited, 
and unsafe storage of a firearm. 
Nova Scotia Provincial Court
The accused argued the  warrant was 
fundamentally  flawed on its face because 
of its date range and thus invalid. The 
warrantless search therefore constituted a 
breach of his s. 8 Charter right to be secure against 
unreasonable search and seizure. The judge agreed, 
finding the error on the face of the warrant was 
more than a mere typographical error. In the judge’s 
opinion, both the justice of the  peace and the 
police were negligent.  She stated:
… [I]n the circumstances, both the officer who 
executed, any of the officers who handled and 
executed the warrant, failed to note that there 
was a problem on the face of the warrant and 
the JP failed to note that the time frame that she 
was authorizing for execution of a warrant was, 
in fact, an impossibility.? 
... It’s the opinion of this Court that it represents 
negligence on the part of both the JP who 
signed it and the police officer who wrote the 
dates in, and the officer or officers who, in turn, 
executed the warrant, because … it’s a serious 
thing and, quite frankly, a great responsibility 
for people to be able to enter into people’s 
private residences with a warrant, and we 
should all be sure that warrants are carefully 
considered, issued only in the proper 
circumstances, that they are accurate, that the 
dates are accurate, and anyone handling a 
warrant after execution should be sure that they 
have authority to do what is in the warrant by 
having careful regard to the dates that are 
contained in the warrant.
Since the warrant was invalid, the search was 
unreasonable and violated s. 8. As a remedy under 
s. 24(2), the judge excluded the evidence. She 
found the facial error could have  been noted by the 
issuing justice or the executing officers with a 
minimum of care and attention. Moreover, the 
police were  aware that the premises was vacant 
and, with no apparent risk  for the destruction of 
evidence, there was no need to act expeditiously 
on the warrant. The accused was acquitted of all 
charges.
Nova Scotia Court of Appeal
The Crown challenged the trial 
judge’s rulings, arguing that the 
trial judge erred in both finding 
the warrant invalid and in 
excluding the evidence. 
The Search Warrant
The Court of Appeal noted that “the time frame for 
execution specified in the warrant is an 
impossibility  and a clear error.” Nevertheless, the 
Crown submitted that the erroneous and factually 
impossible time for the warrant’s execution did not 
render it invalid. Rather than requiring the warrant 
only need meet the  reasonableness standard 
(authorized by law, based on reasonable  grounds 
and conducted in a reasonable manner), the Crown 
contended the trial judge required a standard of 
facial perfection. Here, the Crown argued that the 
error was a typographical mistake that did not 
invalidate the warrant, nor render the search of the 
home unreasonable. The Crown also asserted that 
the trial judge erred by injecting the  common-law 
concept of negligence into the reasonableness 
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analysis. The warrant, as the Crown maintained, 
was presumptively valid and therefore the trial 
judge erred in quashing it. 
The Court of Appeal concluded that the  trial judge 
did not require perfection from the police  nor 
improperly consider the presence of negligence. 
First, the trial judge was aware that some errors on 
the face of a warrant could be mere typographical 
and trivial in nature and would not impact the 
warrant’s presumptive validity while other errors 
could be far from harmless and invalidate a 
warrant. Second, negligence is not confined to tort 
claims and can be used in determining the nature 
of an error on the face of a warrant. Terms such as 
“negligence” and “carelessness” are often used by 
courts when assessing police conduct such as 
whether the police have grounds for a warrant or 
when undertaking a s. 24(2) analysis. 
In this case, it was not an error for the trial judge to 
conclude that the  failure  of the police to notice the 
obvious error on the face of the warrant was 
negligent. There is an expectation that an executing 
officer should assure themselves that they are about 
to act in accordance with the terms of a warrant. 
Thus, they need to read it:
Here, the warrant was not “regular” on its face 
– it contained an obvious error with respect to 
the time frame for execution.?  It was well 
within the purview of the trial judge to infer 
either that the obvious error was not noted by 
police, or conversely, they acted on it 
notwithstanding the error.? No evidence was 
offered to explain why or how the police acted 
in the face of an obvious error on the warrant. 
[para. 36]
s. 24(2) Charter
As for the admissibility of the evidence under s. 
24(2), the Court of Appeal found the trial judge 
considered appropriate factors and did not err in 
excluding it. 
The Crown’s appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
LINK BETWEEN ACCUSED & 
SUITCASE MISSING, DESPITE 
DRUG DOG HIT
R. v. Molnar, 2018 MBCA 
?
A police officer received a tip from a 
reliable  confidential informer that a 
person named “Andrea Molnar” was 
travelling by train from Agassiz, British 
Columbia to Washago, Ontario (two known ports 
in the  drug trade). The informer said Molnar had 
purchased a one-way ticket with cash and had a 
locked grey suitcase smelling of marijuana.? The 
police, however, did not have time to act on that 
tip.?A month later, through his usual checks with 
VIA Rail Canada, the officer learned that an 
“Andrea  Molnar” had purchased a one-way ticket 
with cash for the same trip.?When the train stopped 
in Winnipeg, the police sought out passenger 
“Andrea?Molnar” (the accused) and detained her 
for a drug investigation.?  She was cautioned and 
remained in a police vehicle while the investigation 
proceeded.
Based on his experience, the 
officer determined that he had a 
reasonable  suspicion for a 
sniffer dog - trained to identify 
six different types of drugs - 
c h e c k o u t t h e b a g g a g e 
compartment of the train.? The dog smelled drugs in 
a grey suitcase, but the only tag on it indicated the 
destination of Washago. The suitcase had no 
ownership information nor was it linked to an 
owner.? Once the  dog indicated the presence of 
drugs in the grey suitcase, the accused was arrested 
for possessing drugs for the purpose of 
trafficking.? The accused was again cautioned and 
the suitcase was pried open. In it, police found a 
large garbage bag  and coffee  grounds (a  substance 
commonly used to mask the odour of marihuana) 
as well as 20 half-pound vacuumed packed bags of 
marihuana. The accused’s purse and a  duffel bag 
were also searched.? These searches provided the 
luggage ticket that matched the tag  number on the 
grey suitcase and a key to the suitcase. The accused 
was charged with possessing marihuana for the 
purpose of trafficking.
Volume 18 Issue 3 - May/June 2018
PAGE 48
Manitoba Court of Queen’s Bench
The accused challenged the admissibility 
of the seized evidence arguing her rights 
under the Charter were breached. The 
judge found the  accused’s detention, 
arrest and searches incidental to it did not violate 
the Charter. In the  judge’s view, the experienced 
police officers carefully conducted the investigation 
“by the book.” The police easily  had reasonable 
suspicion to detain the accused and use a drug dog 
to sniff the luggage. As well, the  common law 
power of search incidental to arrest permitted the 
police to search the suitcase. The police had 
reasonable grounds to arrest the accused for 
possessing marihuana for the purpose of trafficking 
once the dog made the hit. They searched the 
suitcase for a valid objective and conducted the 
search in a reasonable manner. Since there were no 
Charter breaches, it was unnecessary to consider s. 
24(2) and the accused was convicted  
Manitoba Court of Appeal
The accused conceded that 
the police had the reasonable 
suspicion necessary to detain 
her and to deploy the sniffer 
dog.?However, she argued that the police did not 
have the required reasonable grounds to arrest her 
immediately after the sniffer dog’s positive hit on 
the suitcase. In her view,  there was not a  sufficient 
connection between herself and the suitcase  that 
provided reasonable grounds at the time of her 
arrest. ?
The Arrest
Justice Hamilton, speaking for the unanimous Court 
of Appeal, agreed there  were not objective 
reasonable grounds to believe that the  accused had 
committed the offence. She held there was not a 
sufficient connection between the accused and the 
suitcase. 
?
“The difference  between reasonable suspicion and 
reasonable grounds to believe has been described 
as the “degree of certainty” … that is required,” 
said Justice Hamilton. “Reasonable suspicion is a 
lower standard.” It only  requires proof that the 
individual targeted is possibly engaged in criminal 
activity.  Reasonable grounds to arrest, on the other 
hand, requires a stronger connection between an 
accused and the offence being investigated. In this 
case, the Appeal Court found the stronger 
connection required for arrest was missing. 
Although the dog hit on the suitcase elevated the 
officer’s reasonable suspicion that the suitcase 
contained marihuana to reasonable grounds (both 
subjectively  and objectively), the hit did not 
provide any more information to connect the 
accused to the suitcase. “While the objective  facts 
were strong (both subjectively and objectively) for 
the reasonable suspicion that the  accused was 
travelling with the grey  suitcase, it was not strong 
enough to meet the higher threshold of reasonable 
grounds to believe required to arrest the accused,” 
said Justice Hamilton. The police did not know that 
the suitcase belonged to the accused nor had they 
seen the person in possession of the bag.?Although 
the police had received a tip regarding the accused 
travelling with a bag, they had no other information 
tying the accused to the bag:
  
The Officer’s Purported Grounds
The evidence linking the accused to the 
grey suitcase:
• A month before the arrest, an officer 
received a tip from a reliable confidential 
informant that a person named Andrea 
Molnar was travelling from Agassiz to 
Washago (two known ports in the drug 
trade) on a one-way train ticket, paid for 
by cash, with a locked grey suitcase 
smelling of marijuana;
• The accused was named Andrea Molnar 
and was travelling via train from Agassiz 
to Washago;
• The suitcase was locked and grey, but did 
not smell of marijuana; and
• The suitcase in question was tagged for 
the destination of Washago.
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To conclude, the di f ference between 
reasonable suspicion to detain and reasonable 
and probable grounds to arrest is a matter of 
degree. Reasonable suspicion is generally 
framed in terms of possibility, while reasonable 
g r o u n d s f o r a r r e s t i s l i n k e d t o 
probability.? Reasonable suspicion is a lower 
threshold than reasonable grounds to believe. ?
There was no evidence that the grey suitcase in 
question was the only grey suitcase in the 
baggage car bound for Washago. While the 
evidence was strong to establish a reasonable 
suspicion, particularly after [the dog’s] positive 
hit on the grey suitcase, … the required strong 
connection between the grey suitcase and the 
accused for the RCMP to have objective 
reasonable grounds to arrest her did not exist.? 
[para. 35]
The trial judge erred in law that the  police had 
reasonable grounds to believe that the accused was 
travelling with the grey suitcase.? Therefore, the 
police did not have reasonable grounds to arrest 
her and, as a result, her arrest was unlawful as were 
the searches incidental to it.
s. 24(2) Charter
Despite finding a s. 8 Charter breach, the Court of 
Appeal admitted the evidence under s. 24(2). The 
breach was at the  low end of seriousness, 
minimally impacted the accused’s privacy interests, 
and the evidence was reliable and important to the 
Crown’s case. The long-term repute of the 
administration of justice would be impacted 
negatively by excluding the evidence in the 
circumstances.??
The accused’s appeal was dismissed and her 
conviction upheld.
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
TRAVELLER NOT DETAINED 
WHEN BORDER OFFICER X-
RAYED HIS LUGGAGE
R. v. Peters, 2018 ONCA 493
?
The accused returned from Jamaica to 
Toronto and arrived at the  Pearson 
International Airport. He was the 
subject of a “lookout” on the Canadian 
Border Services Agency (CBSA) computer and was 
sent for a secondary customs inspection. At the 
secondary inspection, the  CBSA officer asked the 
accused questions and elicited answers about the 
contents of his luggage while it was  searched. As a 
result of his search, the border officer found several 
sealed plastic  bags containing a dried food product. 
Upon x-ray inspection, each plastic  bag revealed 
round denser areas of organic material in the 
middle of each bag. The CBSA officer asked the 
accused several additional questions and obtained 
his responses about the provenance of the bags and 
how much he paid for them. When the border 
officer slit open the bags, he found a round puck-
like object wrapped in brown packing tape  inside 
each of the bags. He asked the accused what it was 
and the accused answered he did not know. The 
CBSA officer cut into one of the pucks and found 
white powder. He conducted a narcotics field test, 
which indicated the presence of cocaine. The 
accused was arrested for importing almost three (3) 
kilograms of cocaine,. He was also provided his 
right to counsel and was cautioned.
Ontario Superior Court of Justice
The accused sought to have his 
statements made to the  CBSA officers 
excluded as evidence. But the judge 
dismissed the application. The judge 
“To conclude, the difference between reasonable suspicion to detain and reasonable and 
probable grounds to arrest is a matter of degree. Reasonable suspicion is generally 
framed in terms of possibility, while reasonable grounds for arrest is linked to 
probability. Reasonable suspicion is a lower threshold than reasonable grounds to 
believe.”
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found the accused was not detained until the CBSA 
officer cut into the plastic  bags and found the 
pucks. It was at that time that “a reasonable  person 
placed in the position of the border services 
officer would conclude that there was such a 
strong particularized suspicion connecting the 
accused to a specific crime that the questioning 
and customs examination had changed from one 
of routine to a focused investigation of a specific 
offence.” The judge also concluded that the 
question and answer following detention could be 
subject to exclusion, but the  accused did not want 
these excluded. The accused was convicted of 
smuggling cocaine and sentenced to 6.5 years in 
prion less credit for pre-trial custody.
Ontario Court of Appeal
The accused argued, in part, 
that the trial judge erred in 
determining when he was 
detained. In his view, he was 
detained upon the x-raying of his luggage and twas 
immediately entitled to be advised of his right to 
counsel at that time. He contended the trial judge 
applied too high a standard in deciding when 
detention occurred by conflating the required 
“reasonable suspicion” test for detention in the 
border context with reasonable and probable 
grounds for arrest. The accused also argued the trial 
judge overemphasized the CBSA officer’s subjective 
belief that there was not a sufficiently strong 
particularized suspicion that the  accused was 
smuggling illegal drugs when the officer x-rayed the 
food bags. The accused argued the officer’s belief in 
this regard was not objectively reasonable. Because 
the CBSA of f icer cont inued to ask him 
incriminating questions after he should have been 
told about his right to a lawyer, the accused’s 
answers should have been excluded from the 
evidence at trial.
Detention
The Court of Appeal disagreed with the accused. 
“The trial judge adverted to and applied the 
correct analysis to determine detention in an 
international border context, namely, whether the 
border officer has ‘decided, because of some 
sufficiently strong particularized suspicion, to go 
beyond routine questioning of a  person and to 
engage in a more intrusive form of inquiry’,”  said 
the Appeal Court. “Where the officer has made 
that decision, the individual may be detained, even 
when subject to that routine questioning.”
In this case, the trial judge was unable to say 
whether the CBSA officer had grounds to arrest the 
accused at the  time of x-ray or such particularized 
suspicion in relation to a specific offence that the 
accused was detained. The Court of Appeal found 
the trial judge  properly considered the factual 
c i rcums tances , i nc lud ing the ob jec t ive 
reasonableness of the CBSA officer’s subjective 
belief. And the trial judge did not confuse the test 
for detention in a customs context with the test for 
arrest. 
[T]he trial judge weighed all of the evidence to 
determine that the border officer’s subjective 
belief did not rise to a particularized suspicion 
that the [accused] may be involved in the 
illegal importation of drugs, and that this 
subjective belief was objectively reasonable in 
the circumstances of this case. In particular, the 
trial judge accepted the border officer’s 
testimony of his past experience that x-ray 
anomalies seen in food products often yield 
innocent results. The officer was not certain 
whether the anomalies in the plastic bags were 
due to the bulking of the food product, and the 
entire constellation of factors he was dealing 
with had not resulted in such a level of 
particularized suspicion to take his questioning 
out of the routine. These were conclusions 
open to the trial judge to make on the record 
before him. [para. 11]
The accused appeal was dismissed. 
?Complete case available at www.canlii.org
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POLICE NEED NOT EXHAUST 
ALL INVESTIGATIVE AVENUES 
BEFORE MAKING ARREST
Tremblay v. Ottawa (Police Services Board), 
2018 ONCA 497
The plaintiffs, Tremblay and his 
spouse Mongrain, were involved in a 
dispute with their neighbours. The 
neighbours alleged their homes were 
being flooded because of a drainage 
pipe Tremblay and Mongrain had installed. The 
neighbours complained to the city, which started a 
by-law proceeding over the pipe, and also brought 
a civil suit against Tremblay and Mongrain. Some of 
the neighbours claimed that Tremblay subsequently 
engaged in intimidating behaviour toward them 
and their families.?
Police received reports that Tremblay had over 20 
encounters with the neighbours, including 
incidents where  he stared at them, photographed 
them in their backyard and pool, laughed and 
cursed at them, gave them the finger, intimidated 
them with his pitbull. It was also alleged that 
Tremblay interfered with a neighbour’s attempts to 
sell their property by parking an old van next to the 
property line with a message spray painted on its 
side in big fluorescent letters, “I AM NOT 
RESPONSIBLE  FOR YOUR BASEMENT FLOODS.” 
The police also received information that gunshots 
were heard on two occasions coming from the 
Tremblay property.
Acting on the reports submitted by other officers, 
the lead investigator conducted a firearms search 
and found Tremblay had a firearms licence and 
three  (3) firearms registered to him at his residence. 
Police then, having confirmed that Tremblay had a 
licence and registration to possess three firearms, 
obtained a public safety firearms warrant under s. 
117.04 of the Criminal Code. With assistance from 
their Tactical Unit, police executed the  warrant. 
They knocked on the door and telephoned the 
home several times, but no one answered. After 
waiting 15 minutes, they then breached the front 
door, called out identifying themselves, and entered 
the home to clear and search it. Three firearms, 
three  pellet guns, a cross-bow, a machete, a folding 
knife and ammunition were found and seized. 
When Tremblay and Mongrain returned home, 
Tremblay was arrested for intimidation and mischief 
and transported to the police station. He was then 
released by police on an undertaking with 
conditions.
At his criminal trial in the Ontario Court of Justice, 
Tremblay was acquitted of intimidation and of 
criminal harassment (a charge that was added by 
the Crown), but was found guilty  of mischief for the 
message written on the side of the van. His 
mischief conviction was upheld on appeal to the 
Ontario Superior Court of Justice but overturned by 
the Ontario Court of Appeal.?
Ontario Superior Court of Justice
The plaintiffs brought a civil action 
against the police seeking damages of 
$500,000 from the Ottawa Police 
Services Board (OSPB), the lead 
investigator, and thirteen other named officers 
claiming torts and Charter breaches. The judge 
found the lead investigator and his employer, the 
OPSB, liable for the following:
• Negligent investigation – there  was no urgency 
to the  investigation and the  police  had other 
options available instead of resorting  to arrest 
and executing a public safety warrant. The 
judge awarded Tremblay $10,000;
• False arrest and unlawful detention – the lead 
investigator did not have reasonable grounds to 
arrest for intimidation and, although having 
grounds to arrest for mischief, should not have 
done so because the public interest could have 
been satisfied without arrest under s. 495(2) of 
the Criminal Code. The judge  awarded 
Tremblay $15,000;
• Wrongful seizure of weapons – the judge 
awarded Tremblay $5,000;
• Breaching s. 8 Charter – the officer failed to 
make full, fair, and frank disclosure in the ITO 
for the warrant and the use of the dynamic 
entry  into the  home was unreasonable. The 
judge awarded Mongrain $10,000.
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The judge also awarded $10,923.58 in special 
damages related legal fess and replacing the 
damaged door and door frame. 
Ontario Court of Appeal
The lead investigator and the 
OPSB appealed the trial 
judge’s ruling. Justice  Juriansz, 
de l ive r ing the Cour t o f 
Appeals decision allowed the appeal and ordered 
the lawsuit dismissed. 
Negligent Investigation
The trial judge suggested that the investigating 
officer had a number of options available  to him 
short of arrest and pursuing a  public safety warrant 
he should have pursued such personally 
interviewing neighbours to find out what steps they 
wanted taken, personally interviewing the plaintiff’s 
to get their side of the story, and discussing ways to 
de-escalate  the tension between the families. She 
found moving forward with the arrest and search 
warrant breached the standard of care expected of 
a reasonable police officer. 
The Court of Appeal, however, concluded the trial 
judge erred in two respects. First, she defined the 
standard of care for negligent investigation without 
evidence as to the standard. Second, she imposed a 
standard of care that was inconsistent with the law:
… [T]he legal principles that apply to 
consideration of the tort of negligent 
investigation in the context of laying charges, 
includ[e] the following:
• The appropriate standard of care for the tort 
of negligent investigation is that of the 
reasonable police officer in similar 
circumstances.?
• In the laying of charges, the reasonable 
standard is informed by the presence of 
reasonable and probable grounds to believe 
the suspect has committed the offence.?
• This standard does not require police to 
establish a?prima facie?case for conviction.
• The police are not required to evaluate the 
evidence to a legal standard or make legal 
judgments. That is the task of prosecutors, 
defence lawyers and judges.
• A police officer is not required to exhaust all 
possible routes of investigation or inquiry, 
interview all potential witnesses prior to 
arrest, or to obtain the suspect’s version of 
events or otherwise establish there is no 
valid defence before being able to form 
reasonable and probable grounds.?  [para. 
60]
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“The question in assessing whether an arrest was 
authorized and is therefore lawful is not whether 
the officer could have done something other than 
arrest,” said the Appeal Court. “Rather, the 
question is: did the officer have grounds to 
arrest?” Here, the trial judge found the 
investigating officer was required to take additional 
investigative steps before arrest. But that is not the 
law. ?
False Arrest 
The trial judge erred in holding  the investigating 
officer did not have reasonable grounds to arrest for 
intimidation. “Had the trial judge  focused on the 
elements of the offence of intimidation, and on the 
information that was available, she would have 
concluded that there were reasonable grounds to 
arrest Tremblay for intimidation,” said Justice 
Juriansz. 
As for the trial judge’s application of s. 495(2) of the 
Criminal Code, the Court of Appeal also found the 
tr ial judge erred. “Section 495(2)(d) of 
the?Criminal Code?stipulates, in part, that a peace 
officer, despite  having grounds to arrest, shall not 
arrest where he or she believes on reasonable 
grounds that the public interest may be  satisfied 
without arresting the person,”  said Justice Juriansz. 
“I observe that?s. 495(2)?only comes into play once 
s. 495(1) is satisfied and the peace officer already 
has grounds to arrest.? Section 495(2)? does not 
require the officer to conduct additional 
investigation to determine if the public interest 
may be satisfied without arresting the person.” He 
continued:
Section 495(2)?places a duty on a police officer 
who has grounds for arrest under s. 495(1), 
to? not? arrest where he or she? believes? on 
reasonable grounds that the public interest may 
be satisfied without arresting the person. The 
phrase “believes on reasonable grounds” makes 
clear that the test for applying the limitation 
in? s. 495(2)? is both subjective and objective. 
The police officer must believe that the public 
interest can be satisfied without arrest, and that 
subject ive belief must be object ively 
reasonable. Both components must be satisfied. 
To be clear, it is not enough for a person 
alleging a violation of? s. 495(2)? to establish 
that, objectively, the public interest can be 
satisfied without an arrest. The person must also 
establish the police officer believed the public 
interest could be satisfied without an arrest but 
went ahead and made the arrest in any 
event.?[para. 93]
Here, the plaintiffs had to prove that the police 
believed on reasonable grounds that the public 
interest, having regard to all of the circumstances, 
could be satisfied without arresting Tremblay. 
However, “on the record, it could not be found 
that [lead investigator] believed on reasonable 
grounds that the public interest could be satisfied 
without arresting Tremblay.” The investigating 
officer believed the public interest required 
Tremblay be placed under certain conditions and it 
was therefore necessary to arrest him to impose 
these conditions. Finally, the trial judge erred in 
“The question in assessing whether an arrest was authorized and is therefore lawful is 
not whether the officer could have done something other than arrest. Rather, the 
question is: did the officer have grounds to arrest?”
“Section 495(2) places a duty on a police officer who has grounds for arrest under s. 
495(1), to not arrest where he or she believes on reasonable grounds that the public 
interest may be satisfied without arresting the person. The phrase ‘believes on 
reasonable grounds’ makes clear that the test for applying the limitation in s. 495(2) is 
both subjective and objective. The police officer must believe that the public interest can 
be satisfied without arrest, and that subjective belief must be objectively reasonable.”
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failing to apply the deeming provision of s. 495(3), 
wh i ch “ d e e m s a n a r r e s t t o b e l aw f u l 
notwithstanding? s. 495(2)? unless the person 
asserting its application ‘alleges and establishes’, 
in the proceedings at issue, that the police 
violated?s. 495(2).”
The Firearms Warrant
The Court of Appeal found “the trial judge’s 
analysis, as a whole, illustrates that, instead of 
assessing whether the ITO, as amplified, contained 
reliable evidence that might reasonably be 
believed, she substituted her own view of the 
evidence and the particular inferences that she 
drew from that evidence.” Had the trial judge 
properly performed her role in reviewing the 
warrant, she would have determined that there 
continued to be?at least some evidence? that might 
reasonably be  believed on the  basis of which the 
public safety firearms warrant could have been 
issued. 
As for her finding that the manner in which the 
warrant was executed was unreasonable, the trial 
judge also erred. First, the Tactical Unit’s entry was 
not “dynamic”. Police knocked, phoned the home 
and waited 15 minutes before breaching the door. 
The police complied with the knock-and-announce 
rule. “If the police receive no answer, they are 
entitled to force entry into a home,” said Justice 
Juriansz.? By suggesting there were other options 
available to the police that were far less invasive 
and traumatic to Tremblay and Mongrain without 
being put to the police for comment or 
explanation, the trial judge was “Monday morning 
quarterbacking.”  As the Court of Appeal noted, 
“the trial judge essentially substituted her own 
after-the-fact view of how the police should have 
acted, without affording them the opportunity to 
comment on her alternatives.”
The OPSB and lead investigator’s appeal was 
allowed and the trial judge’s order was replaced 
with an order dismissing the Tremblay and 
Mongrain  action.
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
 
Monday Morning 
Quarterback
• A person who criticizes the actions or 
decisions of others after the fact, using 
hindsight to assess situations and specify 
alternative solutions. (dictionary.com)
• Someone who says how an event or 
problem should have been dealt with by 
others after it has already been dealt with. 
(Cambridge Dictionary online)
• One who second-guesses; a person who 
unfairly criticizes or questions the 
decisions and actions of other people after 
something has happened. (Merriam-Webster 
online)
• A person who criticizes or suggests 
alternative courses of action from a 
position of hindsight after the event in 
question; a person who, after the event, 
offers advice or criticism concerning 
decisions made by others; one who 
second-guesses. (Collins English Dictionary online)
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“In Service: 10-8”
Sign-up Now
Are you interested in regularly receiving the In 
Service: 10-8 newsletter by email. You can sign 
up by clicking here and then clicking on the 
“Sign up” link:
This “Sign up” link will take you to the free 
Subscription Form that only requires an email. 
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LEGALLY SPEAKING:
Reasonable Grounds for Arrest
“In deciding what constitutes “reasonable grounds”, two conditions must 
exist. Firstly, an arresting officer must subjectively have reasonable grounds 
to believe the accused committed or was in the process of committing an 
indictable offence. ...
The second condition requires that those grounds must be justifiable from an objective point 
of view. This calls for some mental gymnastics in deciding this question. The question is not 
whether I personally believe those grounds were reasonable, or do I think that an average 
member of the public would think this was reasonable. It does not mean would a majority of 
those polled by a professional pollster conclude that [the officer’s] grounds for arrest were 
reasonable. The test is more nuanced than that. The Supreme Court of Canada ...  has said that 
I must decide if a reasonable person with the same experience, training, knowledge, and skills 
as the officer making the observations would to conclude that there were indeed reasonable 
grounds for the arrest. In other words, would a reasonable person with [the officer’] 
experience look at all of the circumstances and say “it’s reasonable to conclude that the 
Accused has committed or is committing an indictable offence”?
The word “reasonable” can mean different things to different people, and case law from court 
whose decisions are binding on me have offered some helpful guidance on what that word 
should mean to me. The “reasonable grounds” standard has been described as “a credibly 
based probability,” or “reasonable probability.” It requires more than mere suspicion. But it is 
something less than the civil standard of proof on a balance of probabilities or a prima facie 
case.  ...
Deciding the question of whether or not reasonable grounds for the belief exist involves a 
consideration of the “totality of the circumstances”. If each individual factor taken by itself is 
insufficient for form reasonable grounds for arrest, I must still consider whether all of these 
factors taken together and decide on the reasonableness of the conclusion that the Accused 
was arrestable.” – BC Provincial Court Judge K. Skilnick in R. v. Malhi, 2018 BCPC 143, paras. 6-9, references omitted
From time to time judges try to explain the reasonable grounds 
standard. Here is a recent effort by a BC Provincial Court judge.
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BACHELOR OF LAW ENFORCEMENT STUDIES
BACHELOR OF PUBLIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION
Expand your academic credentials and enhance your career options.  
Gain the theoretical background, applied skills and specialized 
knowledge for a career in public safety.
keeping communities safe
enforcing the law
on the front line
Apply today. JIBC.ca 604.528.5590    register@jibc.ca  
715 McBride Boulevard, New Westminster, BC
Be the one
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Upcoming Investigation & Enforcement Skills Courses
To register for any of the following courses, click on the course code below or contact the JIBC 
Registration Office at 604.528.5590 or 1.877.528.5591 (toll free). You can check Ways to Register for 
other registration methods and for assistance from the registration office. View the full 2018 Course 
Calendar online for a full list of upcoming Investigation & Enforcement Skills courses in 2018-19.
UPCOMING ONLINE COURSES ?
August 21 30, 2018?
Internet Open Source Investigations (INVE-1022)
October 11, 2018?
Introduction to Administrative Law (INVE-1010)
UPCOMING COURSES IN NEW WESTMINSTER ?
June 25, 2018
Report Writing for Investigators (INVE-1005)
July 14-28, 2018
Introduction to Criminal Law (INVE-1001)
August 27-31, 2018
Introduction to Investigative Skills and Processes 
(INVE-1003)
September 6-7, 2018
Introduction to the Criminal Justice System 
(INVE-1000)?
UPCOMING COURSES IN VICTORIA
September 24-26, 2018
Report Writing for Investigators (INVE-1005)
Apply for the Investigation & 
Enforcement Skills Certificate
Complete the Investigation & 
Enforcement Skills Certificate, an 
academic credential that can help you 
pursue or advance your in the field of 
investigation, enforcement and public 
safety. Many people who have completed 
the requirements for the certificate have 
gone on to a variety of rewarding careers. 
Apply online today. For more 
information, visit the Investigation & 
Enforcement Skills Certificate webpage.
15-007
Online Graduate  
Certificate Programs
INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS 
TACTICAL CRIMINAL ANALYSIS
Expand your credentials and advance your career with 
these online graduate certificates. Learn through real world 
challenges, current cases, curriculum and techniques. 
Gain the specialized theoretical foundation and applied skills 
to function successfully as an analyst.
604.528.5843 JIBC.ca/graduatestudies
715 McBride Boulevard, New Westminster, BC
